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NEWS | Wednesday, 10 October 2007

War on terror spreads to Malta’s global shipping fleet

Parliament is expected to ratify the US shipboarding treaty as the war on terror spreads to the sea for US forces to shadow suspected movements of weapons of mass destruction.
MATTHEW VELLA reports on Malta’s latest adherence to the war on terrorism.

It is a matter of days, maybe a couple of weeks, before a shipboarding treaty signed earlier this year between Malta and the United States, is ratified by the Maltese parliament. Once the debate is over, it will give the US access to Malta’s shipping register, always on condition of the Maltese government’s consent, to board and seize Malta-flagged vessels suspected of illegal trafficking, but more importantly of non-proliferation: the traffic of nuclear weapons.
Clearly, the inclusion of Malta in the Proliferation Security Initiative is important to the US. With 1,220 Maltese-flagged vessels, Malta has the world’s fourth largest shipping register. Liberia, the second largest registry, is also part of the PSI.
But there may be another, possibly more important, interest at stake. As the only state that was openly shipping nuclear missiles, North Korea was originally the target of the PSI. But now that Iran is pursuing its own nuclear technology, has the axis taken a radical shift closer to home?
Certainly, it is up to debate whether the presence of Iran’s national shipping line, the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), which has as its Mediterranean hub the Malta Freeport, is in the PSI’s sights. With some 150,000 TEUs per annum, IRISL generates more than 10% of the Freeport’s existing business. It is the Middle East’s largest commercial shipping company – and it has set up base in Malta as well.
And the Freeport is certainly a matter of interest for the US. The US Department of State and Department of Defence joint report to Congress, an annual report justifying military grants to Malta, described the Malta Freeport in 2005 as a “potentially serious weapons of mass destruction (WMD) transhipment threat.” It claimed the greatest concern to the US on the Freeport is the potential movement of WMD and missile-systems-related items. “The threat of WMD and dual-use material transhipment through the Maltese Freeport is potentially serious. In 2004, the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) established Freeport as its Mediterranean hub. Also, Malta is close to other states of interest (Libya and Algeria).”
With nearly one-third of all international maritime traffic passing through Maltese waters, the Freeport also serves as a transit link in the flow of goods to and from “sensitive areas” such as Libya, Iran and the Balkans. And although the PSI won’t grant the US a carte blanche to board Maltese-flagged vessels, the target will include transhipment operations for goods destined to the Middle East.
Jeff Anderson, the US embassy’s press attaché, does not give a clear answer as to the sort of attention the American government dedicates to IRISL, especially now that the shipboading treaty awaits ratification.
“The Republic of Malta is responsible for ensuring its ports are not used for illicit or illegal activities,” he says, reminding that the US had donated the Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS) machine in use at the Freeport. “This equipment safeguards against the proliferation of weapons and weapons systems, and it has helped Maltese Customs authorities uncover countless shipments of counterfeit contraband.
“The US is also assisting the government of Malta with the renovation of a warehouse at the Freeport that will house the VACIS equipment and will serve as a permanent office for Malta Customs at the Freeport. The completed warehouse will be in operation by the end of this month.”
But as to Iran, no clear answers.
What is sure is that, as Anderson says, the shipboarding agreement establishes a clear chain of communication between US and Maltese authorities for rapid action consent procedures for boarding, search, and seizure of vessels. While an interdiction on the high seas depends on the interest of the vessel’s flag state, shipboarding can only occur if the flag state gives its expressed permission.
And yet, trafficking in weapons of mass destruction is not the real problem because, except for North Korea, no states are known to have exported WMDs. That’s because nonproliferation is not about intercepting complete weapons systems in transit, but to prevent the shipment of the ingredients to build WMDs. These ingredients – components, technologies, and production materials associated with WMD — are far more elusive because they have civilian as well as military uses and their trade is not illegal.
And because 95% of the ingredients for WMD are dual-use in nature, nations pursuing WMDs often import these components under the guise of civilian nuclear programs or peaceful scientific and commercial activities.
It is one thing for PSI members to justify blocking shipments of materials such as highly enriched uranium bound for a country such as Iran. But on what grounds can they interdict and deny a state technology or materials that have legitimate commercial applications?
Iran has purchased many components it would need to enrich uranium and develop a complete nuclear fuel cycle. Countries like Russia have willingly supplied nuclear technology for Iran’s “peaceful” nuclear program. What would happen if Russia approved the sale of dual-use items on grounds that they would be put to benevolent use? Would the US or Malta interdict this transfer — even in the absence of a smoking gun — if it believed the items would go to support a clandestine nuclear programme?
Jeff Anderson says that, while it will be the flag state’s prerogative to give expressed permission for boarding, search, and seizure of vessels, it would be the US to make the case to Malta that suspected material is intended for improper use. “The flag state can deny action against a vessel if it believes that the evidence presented is inconclusive,” Anderson says.
So the limitations of the PSI and of its ability to obtain broad consensus on the application of interdiction principles can turn into potential obstacles. It will also rest on the willingness of Malta to participate in the US’s interdiction efforts when this might be contrary to the island’s economic interests.
In itself the PSI does not address the problem of companies and entities in the United States and other industrialized countries that violate export control regulations and sell dual-use components. Companies in Western nations have historically been the principal sources of WMD proliferation – something the PSI in itself cannot solve.


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