After the referendum, the winners and the losers

 What comes next for the protagonists of the divorce referendum.

Joseph Muscat’s successful gamble | Lawrence Gonzi’s self inflicted defeat | Comeback kids | AD: Vindicated or stripped? | The church’s defeat | Desperately seeking Deborah

Joseph Muscat’s successful gamble

Joseph Muscat’s gamble to go for a referendum, which he had initially opposed as well as his “personal” stance in favour of divorce, have politically paid off. 

But while the result has enhanced Muscat’s stature, it might well be the case that a No result would have been more convenient for the Labour Party.

While a No victory would have offered the Labour Party an electoral opportunity to ride on the anger and bitterness of pale blue Yes voters, the Nationalist Party now has two full years to recover them.

But after piloting the referendum motion, Muscat raised the stakes to a point where a No victory would have backfired on the Labour leader.

Initially sceptical of the idea submitting a minority right like divorce to a referendum (as first proposed by Lawrence Gonzi), in February, Muscat craftily exploited Gonzi’s u-turn when his party proposed that the referendum should only be held if divorce was approved in parliament. 

Muscat did so by getting the support of his whole parliamentary group, including those opposed to divorce, for a parliamentary motion approved thanks to two votes from the government’s side, which made last week’s referendum possible.

In so doing, he took a gamble which could have backfired. But had the No camp carried the day, he would have been blamed for taking the troops to a battle which they could not win. Yet it was not a leap in the dark, as all surveys at the time pointed towards a Yes majority. It was only after Easter that polls started showing a decline in the Yes vote.

Increasingly aware of the high stakes involved, Muscat did take a more vocal stand, especially in the last days of the campaign. And his reluctance to commit his party machine was counterbalanced by the bias of the Labour media. 

This could have been decisive in mobilising the Labour vote in the referendum.

An analysis of the result shows that with the exception of Gozo, Labour voters have largely heeded their leader’s final appeal for a Yes vote, a reflection of the high regard for the leader in the party’s electoral dynamics.

In fact, in the first seven Labour leaning districts, the percentage of Yes votes are nearly identical to those gained by the Labour Party in the 2008 general election.

There are also indication that a number of anti-divorce labour voters preferred to stay at home than vote against.

The referendum victory has definitely boosted Muscat’s image as Labour’s winning horse. 

But Muscat’s unwillingness to commit his party before the referendum, as well as his decision to allow MPs to abstain afterwards, may return to haunt him when dealing with the last two standing conservative Labour MPs. 

The decision of Labour heavyweight Coleiro Preca to abstain and not contest the next  election, coupled with Adrian Vassallo’s promise to vote No, provide Muscat’s with an opportunity to create a more homogenous secular party.

But the bitterness felt by the two MPs could be a consequence of Muscat’s unwillingness to commit the party before the referendum, and the way he secured the support of Labour’s anti-divorce brigade without even a commitment that they will be obliged to vote Yes in parliament if the referendum is approved.

This puts anti-divorce MPs in a quandary; knowing that while they were free to oppose divorce, they were contradicting the stand taken by the leader, which during the campaign became more and more identified with the party. 

Astonishingly, Muscat even gave these MPs the freedom to abstain in the forthcoming divorce vote, thus providing Gonzi with an alibi for the abstention of his own MPs. This weakened Muscat’s argument that MPs have a duty to ratify the referendum result.

Lawrence Gonzi’s self inflicted defeat

Lawrence Gonzi’s decision to commit his party against divorce has not only backfired but has left a deep scar in the liberal-conservative coalition which turned the PN in to a powerful electoral warhorse.

An  analysis of the result points at the crucial role for pro-divorce Nationalist voters in the ninth (Swieqi, San Gwann, Gharghur, Ibrag and Msida) and twelfth district (Naxxar, Mellieha, Saint Paul’s Bay).

A comparison of the referendum and the general election results of 2008 reveals that the PN vote roughly corresponds to the No vote in the referendum in the first seven districts. This suggests that voters of both parties in the first seven districts generally followed either the party line in the case of the PN or the leader’s position in the case of Labour. 

But the situation changes in the Nationalist leaning eight, ninth, tenth, eleventh and twelfth district.

In all these districts the Yes vote always attracts a higher percentage than the Labour Party’s 2008 performance, while the No vote always scores a lower percentage than the Nationalist Party. This is only partially accounted for by AD’s relatively stronger presence in these districts.

The situation is most pronounced in the ninth district (Swieqi, San Gwann, Msida) where Labour scored a meagre 36% in 2008 while the PN scored 62%. In this district, the Yes vote scored its best result in the Nationalist oriented districts – 54%.

Liberal Nationalist voters also had a pronounced role in the twelfth (Naxxar, St Paul’s Bay) district where only 39% voted Labour in 2008 but 53% voted for divorce in the referendum.

The situation was less pronounced but still evident in the 10th district (Sliema) which was won by the Yes campaign by a whisker.  But the Yes share is far higher than the 34% had votes Labour in 2008, while 2.4% had voted AD.

The split between the party’s conservative and liberal wings could not be more evident in the very different results in the equally Nationalist leaning Gozo, where the No vote won hands on, and the tenth district where the Yes vote won, together with the even more Nationalist leaning ninth, tenth and twelfth districts.

What’s worse for Gonzi is that it was a self-inflicted wound, having been the first to suggest a referendum which put the  party in a lose-lose situation. For while, a Yes victory is a definitive blow, a No victory would have been a pyrrhic one, as it would have permanently alienated pro-divorce voters.

Despite Gonzi’s low profile, the campaign leaves the party closely identified with the confessional views expressed by his closest acolytes in the parliamentary group, such as Tonio Fenech, who went as far as to suggest that the Virgin Mary was weeping because of divorce.

While this stance endeared the party with cultural conservatives it created a great sense of alienation amongst liberal supporters.

But the Yes victory could well be a blessing for the Nationalist Party even if it raises questions on Gonzi’s leadership. Thanks to the Yes victory, the party has two full years to recover these voters.

The party is surely not new to u-turns, having superficially re-invented itself as a green friendly party before the 2008 election after committing the some of the worst planning blunders in history. 

The question is whether Gonzi is the best leader to heal a rift to which he and his closest acolytes have contributed to create. 

His failure to show leadership by committing his MPs to ratify the referendum result, and his own indecision on how to vote in the forthcoming parliamentary debate, has further diminished Gonzi’s stature among level headed Nationalist voters.

Comeback kids

Pullicino Orlando has seen his star shine again after the big setback he received when he was refused a post in Gonzi’s cabinet despite being elected from two districts in the wake of the Mistra scandal.

After flirting briefly with immigration – where he pushed a hard-line agenda – through divorce he found an issue which endeared him to liberals.

Pullicino Orlando has secured a place in history as harbinger of a more secular Malta.  Few politicians could be lauded for having the balls to change the course of history as Pullicino Orlando did on that summer day when he dropped the divorce bombshell on both Gonzi and Muscat.

As the person who set the process in motion by presenting a private member’s bill, Pullicino Orlando stood most to gain from a Yes victory and most to lose from a No vote.  

Flanked by Evarist Bartolo and Michael Briguglio on the winning side of history, Pullicino Orlando has gone a long way in exorcising the Mistra scandal, which nearly ruined his political career despite being elected from both districts.

Still, a Yes victory could serve as a tonic for Gonzi’s fragile one-seat majority. A victorious Pullicino Orlando is less of a time bomb for Gonzi’s one seat majority than an embittered and wounded one. Now, alongside other pro-divorce Nationalist exponents like former Minister Michael Falzon, he could have a strategic role in keeping pro-divorce Nationalists in the party.

Still, Pullicino Orlando is still likely to recriminate the role taken by the establishment to prop up the No campaign. And if there is an attempt by conservative MPs to introduce elements in the divorce law which go against the spirit of the divorce law proposed before the referendum, Pullicino Orlando could be unforgiving.

Bartolo, the other proponent of the divorce bill, has also seen his star rise again after being eclipsed in the leadership contests in which he suffered a humiliation against Muscat. 

His role in the Labour media was also vital in the last days of the campaign even if he exposed himself to accusation of breaching the party’s ‘neutrality’ on this issue. Bartolo who contests the tenth and twelfth districts both Nationalist leaning districts where the yes vote prevailed, could also have a strategic role as a charmer of the pale blue liberal vote.  Other Labour MPs whose pre-referendum Yes stance paid off were Leo Brincat, Luciano Busuttil and Owen Bonnici.

AD: Vindicated or stripped?

Having been the party to first propose divorce 20 years ago, AD’s credibility as a forerunner of the political debate has been enhanced. AD has also emerged as the only party to be on the right side of history in both the EU and the divorce referenda.

But the party has also lost one of the issues that most clearly distinguish it from the PN and PL.

With divorce settled in the referendum and environmental issues gone mainstream, AD has to seek new battle cries. For the divorce referendum has seen exponents from both major parties taking ownership of an issue once solely championed by the greens.

On a more positive note, the referendum has made the relatively new AD leader Michael Briguglio a recognisable face, and it has vindicated his decision to turn divorce in one of the  party’s main platform two years ago.  

An analysis of the result opens new opportunities for the party if it is able to interpret the grievances of liberal pale blue voters in the ninth and tenth districts-the only two districts where the party surpassed the 2% mark in 2008. So does dissatisfaction with MPs on both sides of the divide, intent on defying the referendum result. 

The church’s defeat

The Archbishop’s half-hearted and embargoed “apology” for actions which might have caused hurt was the final act of a campaign in which the church failed to restrain its fundamentalist streak.

The adoption of tactics reminiscent of the 60s by some priests and the hard-line stance of Gozo Bishop Mario Grech who described pro divorce Catholics as “wolves” and “brigands” have tarnished the reputation of the church with a new generation, which had not lived through those dark times.It also re-opened the traditional rift between Labour voters and the church. 

The church also failed to distance itself clearly from the loony fringe of the No campaign, which exploited the image of Christ in the campaign. 

But the Yes victory could be a blessing for those elements in the church who feel uncomfortable with the exercise of temporal power and who would like it to give priority to issues related to social justice. 

And while a No victory would have been seen as an imposition which would have bred visceral anti-clericalism, the Yes victory could serve a tonic towards a more gradual modernisation in which the church could play a diminished but still significant role.

Desperately seeking Deborah

Deborah Schembri emerged from the referendum as the most persuasive yes campaigner. By not excluding a political career, Schembri has given weight to rumours that the Labour Party were courting her all along. Despite suffering financially due to the ecclesiastical court decision to exclude her from the tribunal, her popularity as a family lawyer has been enhanced. On the no side, Arthur Galea Salamone emerged as the moral victor, being the only exponent from the No campaign to face the music when the result was out. This has increased his stature, even among those who disagreed with him throughout the campaign.

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And our beloved President is nowhere to be seen! http://mazzun.wordpress.com/2011/06/06/il-megpresidente-e-uno-stronzo/