US embassy cables | How did the United States perceive Malta in 1977?

The United States embassy cables from Valletta, declassified by the Department of State and released by the US National Archives, show that despite Dom Mintoff’s bluster and posturing, Malta’s role in Mediterranean security was crucial to the superpower.

“We do not want Soviet or other anti-Nato military forces to have access to Malta’s harbours, airfields or ship repair and fuel facilities. We would prefer that Nato, or individual alliance governments continue to have air and naval access to Malta in some form after the Nato-financed British/Maltese military facilities agreement expires in 1979,” wrote US ambassador Bruce Laingen on 1 April, 1977, in a cable to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.

But in 1977, three years since turning Malta into a constitutional republic with its own head of state, Mintoff was intent on declaring the country a “neutral” and non-aligned state, and denying the use of Maltese facilities to all foreign armed forces after 1979 when the last British soldier left the island at the end of the Nato defence agreement.

“Although it would mean the less of what Nato now gains through the British military presence it would, at the same time, assure the continuance of Soviet denial,” Laingen wrote.

But Mintoff was also troubled by the fact that his vision for a demilitarised Mediterranean meant that neutrality for Malta was economically not sustainable, and that he needed financial assistance from European guarantors of Malta’s security.

“The key issue is how much, if anything, the Nato governments, including the US, might be willing to assist the Maltese financially after 1979,” Laingen said, noting that a reduced standard of living “could lead the Maltese to reverse themselves and try to sell their military useful facilities to the highest bidder, a bidder who could well be inimical to US interests.”

Laingen described Mintoff, recently re-elected in the 1976 elections, as pursuing a “domineering, one-man style of government”.

Mintoff wanted to secure a neutral status for Malta guaranteed by Italy, France, Libya and Algeria, in exchange for the permanent elimination of the superpowers – the Sixth Fleet and the Soviet Fleet – from Malta.

In 1972, his threat to expel the British forces won him an annual $36 million rent for the Maltese base, apart from the additional $50 million this generated in local revenue from the military presence on the island – 17% of gross domestic product at the time.

But by his own calculations, he also faced 23,000 jobless men and women after 1979, which is why he wanted the nations guaranteeing Malta’s neutrality to support the country financially.

“It is clear what Mintoff wants, and expects… to cajole other countries into continuing to subsidise the Maltese economy and the current Maltese way of life after the British armed forces depart.

“Mintoff’s main weapon is to threaten that if the Western Europeans do not agree to his financial demands, then he will turn to the Arabs, especially his friend Gaddafi, for such support. He obviously is counting on Nato concern over the military dangers of possible Libyan control of Malta to enable him to extract what he wants from those Western European governments with major interests in Mediterranean security.”

Italy and France were tasked with the lengthy negotiations to reach an agreement with Mintoff, but progress was slow. The Americans blamed “the vagueness of Mintoff’s ideas” while the Europeans did not want to give him a blank cheque.

“Mintoff is beginning to show signs of impatience, which is typical of his negotiating style, and he is becoming increasingly vocal in his threat to turn to the ‘Libyan connection’ if the Europeans do not move faster,” Laingen noted.

Both the Americans and the British tried to act passive in the face of Mintoff’s pressure, eager not to cave in as easily to his threats as they had done back in the 1971-1972 ‘crisis’ negotiations over a continued British military presence in Malta.

“Mintoff clearly prefers to have the best of both worlds. He is no fool, and he knows full well that anything he might obtain from Gaddafi will have many more strings attached than would European assistance. But there is also something of the Arab in him, including a complex about the West having lorded it over this part of the world far too long.”

America was however aware Mintoff was unwilling to let Soviet influence enter Malta or to have a dominant Libyan influence, and chose to actively stay out of the European negotiations.

Instead it preferred to exploit the Maltese people’s ties to the West. “We have to remind the Maltese of their deep cultural affinity with Europe and the US.”

Laingen also added a kick to his cable to Washington: after years of being snubbed by US president Richard Nixon and secretary of state Henry Kissinger, Mintoff was still hoping to visit the White House, after Borg Olivier was granted an audience by John F. Kennedy.

“If we and our allies play our cards right, we may accelerate the change that the economic realities of 1979 may be just beginning to produce in Mintoff’s thinking. A well-timed and well-coordinated invitation to visit Washington could pay worthwhile dividends in influencing a man who is both conscious of slights and enormously susceptible to attentions paid him.”