Secret CIA manual shows spies how to survive EU airport screening

Secret document published by Wikileaks gives examples of security measures which the CIA believes its operatives must be aware of in order to avoid having their cover blown during “secondary screening” when a traveller is pulled aside for additional scrutiny.

A secret CIA manual published by WikiLeaks – “Surviving Secondary Sreening” –  details how airports in the European Schengen zone, pose a threat to covert operatives travelling through EU airports.

The secret document provides examples of security measures which the CIA believes its operatives must be aware of in order to avoid having their cover blown during “secondary screening” when a traveller is pulled aside for additional scrutiny.

“Even when the traveler does everything right, the best protection during secondary screening is to be well-prepared with a cover story, according to an experienced CIA traveler,” the manual says.

“In one incident during transit of a European airport in the early morning, security officials selected a CIA officer for secondary screening. Although the officials gave no reason, overly casual dress inconsistent with being a diplomatic-passport holder may have prompted the referral. When officials swiped the officer’s bag for traces of explosives, it tested positive, despite the officer’s extensive precautions. In response to questioning, the CIA officer gave the cover story that he had been [given] in counterterrorism training in Washington, DC.”

“Although language difficulties led the local security officials to conclude that the traveler was being evasive and had trained in a terrorist camp, the CIA officer consistently maintained his cover story. Eventually, the security officials allowed him to rebook his flight and continue on his way.”

The manual also suggests: “Hostile and probably even allied services seek to identify US and other foreign intelligence officers,” and, “The combination of procedures available in secondary, a stressful experience for any traveler, may pose a significant strain on an operational traveler’s ability to maintain cover.”

Anyone in secondary inspection would “likely have no right of access to their embassy or to other outside assistance.”

It advises that “smart phones, iPods, and MP3 players, can pose a vulnerability to alias travel because of their requirement for subscriptions. If border control officials can establish a link between the device and the traveler’s true name, this could present a difficulty for someone traveling in alias,” which is a classic concern of those critical of the global security state.

“Consistent, well-rehearsed, and plausible cover is important for avoiding secondary selection and critical for surviving it,” the manual advises. “A frequent operational CIA traveler to Asia and Europe advises that the most effective prevention of secondary is to have simple and plausible answers to the two most frequently asked questions, ‘Why are you here,’ and ‘Where are you staying.’”

Operatives are to travel with “everything that officials can use to examine their bona fides – including passports, travel history, baggage, personal electronics, pocket litter, hotel reservations, web presence” and determine it is all consistent with their covers.

It warns that Internet access allows airport security officials to examine travelers’ social and business network accounts to confirm that their Web presence corresponds with their persona. For example, Foursquare and LinkedIn are business equivalents to the Facebook social network.”

Here are some other processes the CIA is worried about:

• At Budapest’s Ferihegy Airport in Hungary, security officers use closed circuit television (CCTV) and one-way mirrors to monitor passengers for signs of nervousness.

• The Bahrain National Security Agency (BNSA) deploys undercover officers in the arrivals lounge of Bahrain Airport to actively look for travelers who appear to be nervous.

• Officers of the National Security Service (NSS) in Mauritius use video cameras to observe arriving passengers as they exit the aircraft and retrieve their baggage, zooming on individuals’ faces to study their expressions.

• During passenger arrival procedures at Burgas International Airport in Bulgaria, multiple border police officials, including at least one officer behind the passengers at passport control, monitor passengers for signs of nervousness or other suspicious behaviour.

• “If officials at Narita Airport in Tokyo, Japan, notice someone who appears to be studying the customs inspection process, they assume that someone in that group of passengers must be attempting to smuggle drugs or other contraband and intensify their inspection efforts,” the manual claims.

The incidents cited to warn CIA personnel likely influence what cover stories are adopted and not adopted by agents.

While WikiLeaks may be accused of compromising the CIA’s ability to travel around undercover, the leaked manual does not exactly describe in specifics how to travel covertly and get past secondary screenings. It simply gives general advice based on known incidents in countries where CIA operations are probably ongoing so that personnel can get away with whatever activity they perpetrating in the shadows.