Court denies property division due to plaintiffs’ lack of evidence
In a recent decision, the First Hall of the Civil Court, presided over by Justice Dr Joanna Vella Cuschieri, ruled against the division of a co-owned property in the case of Cathia Mifsud Bonnici et vs. Gemma Micallef
In a recent decision, the First Hall of the Civil Court, presided over by Justice Dr Joanna Vella Cuschieri, ruled against the division of a co-owned property in the case of Cathia Mifsud Bonnici et vs. Gemma Micallef. The judgment, delivered on 27 June 2024, highlights the critical importance of technical evidence and expert testimony in property disputes for an unbiased division of co-owned property.
The plaintiffs sought to divide a property held in common with the defendant. In their application, the plaintiffs stated that the current co-ownership arrangement with the defendant hindered them from developing their property into a multi-unit apartment block.
However, the defendant argued that the property could not be conveniently divided without causing significant damage and prejudice to her property rights. In this regard, defendant’s stance was that the property held jointly was not conveniently divisible and cannot be divided without causing damage to her rights. The defendant claimed that had the plaintiffs’ claims be accepted, she would be gravely prejudiced, especially considering that according to the partition plan presented by the plaintiff, she would have to cede a part of the property that is exclusively hers without any form of compensation.
The court was notably critical of the plaintiffs’ approach, particularly the lack of a court appointed architect to provide an impartial assessment to determine if the property in question could really be conveniently divided and if so, how the division should be made. In its conclusion, the court highlighted that the division of a property held in common was to be based on expert advice by an architect which in this case was to be made by a court appointed architect which plaintiffs chose not to nominate in the stage of producing their evidence.
Instead, the plaintiffs relied solely on a report from their ex-parte architect which report was found to be deficient for several reasons:
1. Biased Information: The architect's report was based solely on documents provided by the plaintiffs, lacking independent verification and hence based on misinformation.
2. Disproportionate Shares: The proposed division did not respect the shares held by the parties, which was determined to be in the 3:1 ratio in favour of the defendant.
3. Exclusive Property Rights: The proposed division suggested dividing a part of the property exclusively owned by the defendant, thereby infringing on her property rights.
4. Loss of Light and Air: The defendant’s right to light and air would be severely compromised by the proposed division.
The court emphasised that an expert should have been appointed to evaluate whether the property could be divided without prejudicing the defendant’s exclusive rights. This step was crucial to ensuring a fair and equitable division to safeguard both right-holders.
In its decision, the court quoted an important legal principle that is the basic parameter for the division of common property: ‘Conveniently, means without prejudice to the interests of the co-owners; without detriment, meaning that there should be no depreciation in the economic value of the property due to its physical division.’
The court concluded that the plaintiffs’ proposal did not meet the standard of being "conveniently divisible." The proposed development was deemed unfair to the defendant, who stood to lose significantly more than she would gain.
The court noted that the compensation proposed by the plaintiffs to the defendant was inequitable. The plaintiffs’ plan required the defendant to cede a larger, exclusively owned portion of the property, while the plaintiff would primarily cede co-owned sections. The court decided that consideration must also be given to how the compensation between the parties was made. In the judgment, it clearly transpires that the Court absolutely disagrees with how this compensation was made, as, firstly, the part that the defendant would have to cede is much larger than that of the plaintiff. Secondly, the majority of the parts that the plaintiff would cede are held in co-ownership, unlike the defendant's case where she would have to cede a part that is exclusively hers. The value given for such property is negligible when considering that by ceding such property, parts that were previously undevelopable or limited for development would turn into developable zones or could be developed more easily and conveniently.
In its final decision, the court denied the plaintiffs’ claims and consequently rejected the plan of division proposed by them.
This case emphasises the necessity of thorough and impartial evidence in legal disputes over property division which in such a case is secured by a court-appointed architect who can give impartial technical evidence. The court's decision to deny the plaintiffs’ requests was rooted in the lack of adequate evidence and the unfairness of the proposed division. The defendant convinced the court that division of co-owned property should always be supported by impartial expert testimony which should safeguard the interests and property rights of all the parties involved. This judgment serves as a crucial reminder that one’s ambition to develop a property must never come at the expense of another co-owner's rights.
The mentioned Court case may be subject to an appeal.