Franco Debono: King, Joker or Ace of Spades?

Gonzi: The cost of survival | Muscat: Waiting for the fall | Franco Debono: Toxic asset or Ace of Spades?

Gonzi: The cost of survival

Trump card: Calling Debono's bluff assuming he will never dare take the blame for bringing the government down.

Prime Minister's options

1.    Call Debono's bluff again by insisting that he would go for an election the moment the government loses any vote in parliament.
2.    Try to block the Opposition's adjournment motion to force Debono to first vote on the budget bill before voting on the opposition's motions of censure.
3.    Call Debono's bluff insisting that he would go for an election even if the rebel MP abstains on the Budget bill irrespective of whether this takes place before or after the motions of censure.
4.    Carry on governing with the life support of the Speaker's vote till the summer recess and go for an election in October.
5.    Try to keep on governing right up to the end of the legislature on the assumption that Debono will not dare bring the government down on crucial money bills.

Gonzi started the week on the offensive, calling Franco Debono's bluff by setting the highly symbolic 9 May date for a crucial vote on the Budget Implementation bill,  which is tantamount to a confidence vote in government.

The 9 May date - which coincides with the 25th anniversary of the 1987 Nationalist victory and Raymond Caruana's date of birth - was meant to intensify pressure on Debono.

Bringing down the government on such a highly symbolic date is bound to increase the opprobrium of hardcore Nationalists towards Debono.

A self-confident Gonzi ignored Debono's threat to link his support on a budget bill to his key demand to hold a vote on the Opposition's motion of censure. In this way, he managed to throw the ball in Debono's court.

But by the end of the week, the Prime Minister was outmanoeuvred by a pincer movement, with rebel backbencher Debono openly acting in collusion with Labour. 

But the collusion between Debono and the opposition - symbolised by the 15-minute chat Muscat had with Debono on the government benches - could well be a gift for Gonzi, in his bid to rally Nationalist voters behind him.

On Thursday, Muscat announced two adjournment motions to force parliament to discuss motions censuring the operation of Carmelo Mifsud Bonnici and asking for the resignation of Permanent EU representative Richard Cachia Caruana. 

The government may well try to find a procedural way to block the opposition from presenting its motion of adjournment in order to  postpone debate on the motions of censure to after 9 May, thus throwing the ball back in Debono's court.

Gonzi may well be thinking that while he can call Debono's bluff, forcing him to abstain in the 9 May vote, he cannot expect the same outcome from the vote on the opposition's motions. 

If the opposition succeeds in its bid to have these motions discussed before 9 May, Gonzi could face a series of humiliating defeats in parliament before the Budget Implementation bill is even discussed.

While a vote of censure in a Minister and a high ranking diplomat are not tantamount to a vote of no-confidence in the entire government, the political embarrassment of such a defeat cannot be underestimated.

This presents Gonzi with another dilemma; should he call Debono's bluff by taking the offensive again by declaring that he would call an election if the government loses any of these votes?

In so doing, Gonzi would be putting on  a brave face, showing the electorate that he is no longer willing to submit himself to Debono's blackmail. 

He would be in a position to rally his electorate from a position of strength.

Opinion polls in the past months have indicated that Gonzi was strongest when he faced the prospect of an early election in January and weakest when after his government survived on the life support offered by the Speaker's casting vote. Since the party is more prepared for an election than it was in January, Gonzi might be tempted to gamble on an early election, banking on a blitz campaign. 

But such a path could be suicidal, as it would link the fortunes of his government to the fate of Mifsud Bonnici and Cachia Caruana, who are far from the most popular elements in his government.

The twinning of the two motions further complicates matters for the government, as it could open a new front for Lawrence Gonzi. The opposition could be fishing for Jeffrey Pullicino Orlando's vote, whose strong and regular criticism of Cachia Caruana is well known. This would also relieve pressure from Debono who would not be only one to vote against the government.

A more likely option would be that the Prime Minister would endure the humiliation of losing the motions of censure, while stamping his feet when it comes to the Budget Implementation Bill, insisting that nothing short of a majority for the government   would be enough to avoid an election.

In this way, he would be passing the ball back to Debono, who would have to decide whether to bring the government down or give it his full support rather than abstaining.

On the other hand, conscious of the fact that he does not stand any chance of winning an early election, Gonzi may decide to rely on the casting vote of the Speaker on the crucial money bill to survive until the summer recess.

This would still raise the prospect of an early election in October. 

But Gonzi may well decide to continue prolonging the life of the government.

In so doing, Gonzi risks getting bogged down trying to find his way in a parliament, which he no longer fully controls, where Debono's appetite could grow from day to day, possibly turning his attention on other ministers who could find themselves axed. 

Gonzi would once again start shunning parliament to avoid controversial votes, though this risks alienating voters. This could eat his support from within.

Muscat: Waiting for the fall

Trump card: Debono's willingness to go all the way to get Carmelo Mifsud Bonnici and possibly others out of the way.

1.     Let the government implode in its own contradictions without lifting a finger.
2.     Accelerate the downfall of the government by passing procedural motions, which could lead to the government losing votes in parliament.

Muscat seems to have discarded the first option of letting the government implode without actually contributing to its demise. 

He seems keen to seize a favourable political moment, which sees his party 12 points ahead in opinion polls.

Still, Labour leader Joseph Muscat is probably wary of ending up with egg on his face for the second time after presenting a vote of no-confidence in the government in January, which failed to pass because of Debono's abstention. 

Although Debono is likely to get the ultimate prize - Mifsud Bonnici's head - it is not certain that Gonzi will go to the President to ask him to dissolve the House. Technically, Gonzi can continue governing without Mifsud Bonnici and Cachia Caruana; Debono can still abstain on the money bill; and the Opposition would have once again raised expectations of an early election, which then fail to materialise. 

Another risk for Muscat is that of being associated too closely with Debono.  Although appreciated by some voters for his outspokenness, he is detested by other middle-of-the-road voters for keeping the country in a state of uncertainty. This could generate a sympathy vote for Gonzi if he puts a brave face, possibly giving the chance to erode Muscat's lead.

But even in that case the risk for Muscat is a very calculated one.

For Gonzi is bound to emerge weaker, even if he survives the crucial money bill, which has to be approved by 14 May.

Technically, if both the adjournment motion and the Opposition's no confidence motions (on Justice and Home Affairs and Richard Cachia Caruana) pass with Debono's support, the government will not fall. But then, Mifsud Bonnici would probably have to resign, making Gonzi's position politically untenable.

This could be the ultimate aim of Muscat latest parliamentary stratagem, which could lead to the Gonzi government being fatally bruised without actually bringing it down.

In fact, it could be well to Muscat's advantage if Gonzi decided to limp on ahead despite losing a number of votes in parliament. This would confirm the perception that Gonzi is clinging to power.

On the other hand, if Gonzi puts a brave face and goes for an early election, Muscat would probably end up Prime Minister a year before time.

Franco Debono: Toxic asset or Ace of Spades?

Trump card: Holding Gonzi hostage to his one-seat majority while enticing Muscat with the prospect of a short cut to power.

Debono's options

1. Vote for the opposition's adjournment motion, vote to censure Carmelo Mifsud Bonnici and Richard Cachia Caruana but then abstain in the crucial Budget Implementation Bill, thus keeping the government hostage to his whims.
2. Vote for both the opposition motion and the Budget Implementation bill, thus giving Gonzi a majority while getting rid Carmelo Mifsud Bonnici and Richard Cachia Caruana.
3. Vote for the opposition motion and against the government in the Budget Implementation Bill, thus bringing the government down.

Debono's power derives from the instability of Gonzi's one-seat majority. On the other hand, Debono's political career will end at the moment this parliament is dissolved.

Therefore, Debono is now caught in a Catch-22 situation.

If he cuts the crap and votes against the government in a crucial money bill, he would risk political oblivion and the opprobrium of Nationalist voters. If he keeps the government limping by abstaining in crucial votes, he risks being blamed for uncertainty and holding the country at ransom.  

If the government does not fall this time around, the crisis may become normalised in the popular psyche. The result? Debono becomes a national joke, a toxic asset even for the opposition.

Still, he has some space for manoeuvre to avoid the direct blame for bringing the government down while accelerating Gonzi's demise.

Debono does not want to get the blame for bringing Gonzi's government down: his secret wish may be that of forcing the Prime Minister's hand in calling an election by bringing down one of his ministers - Mifsud Bonnici.

Still, it was Gonzi's decision to appoint Mifsud Bonnici as leader of the house, which forced Debono's hand.

For supporting the Opposition's motion of adjournment is the only way to overturn parliament's agenda, which is set by Leader of the House - Mifsud Bonnici himself.

But Debono may well find himself checkmated the moment Gonzi decides to raise the stakes; by threatening an early election of Debono does not tow the line.

This would put the onus of responsibility for an early election squarely on Debono even if such a decision could well cost the Prime Minister his job.

It is this state of affairs which keeps both Gonzi and Debono wary of a public divorce, which would inevitably result in an election which could see both of them vanquished.

Still, if he keeps teasing without biting Debono risks losing the respect of Labour voters and those who admire him for being outspoken. By opening too many fronts Debono also keeps confusing people on what he ultimately wants - to reform the edifice of Maltese democracy or simply to chop a couple of heads and push Gonzi to the brink of an early election.