[ANALYSIS] After divorce, the cohabitation government

When the endgame seemed imminent and all the chickens were coming home to roost, Lawrence Gonzi chose to humiliate himself and live for another day. But at what cost does Gonzi’s pact with Jeffrey Pullicino Orlando as kingmaker come?

Will the present crisis allow the re-emergence of the Nationalist Party as a collegial force, or does Gonzi intend to re-contest the next election as a presidential candidate?
Will the present crisis allow the re-emergence of the Nationalist Party as a collegial force, or does Gonzi intend to re-contest the next election as a presidential candidate?

Coalition or cohabitation? | GonziPN - a spell turned into a curse? | Gonzi and the art of survival | Pullicino Orlando - rebel turned kingmaker | Joseph Muscat: waiting in vain? | John Dalli casts his shadow | Franco Debono obscured?

Coalition or cohabitation?

The coalition option was the unexpected but logical outcome of a political crisis in which Gonzi desperately wanted to complete his mandate, while Jeffrey Pullicino Orlando did not want to face the consequences of bringing the government down.

The result is a pact of convenience, a post-nuptial cohabitation agreement after an acrimonious divorce, which leaves Gonzi in power and Jeffrey Pullicino Orlando in the position of kingmaker.

But while coalitions abroad are based on two or more parties sharing a common programme after contesting elections separately, in this case what we have is a coalition between a Prime Minister and an individual backbencher who fell out after sharing the same party platform in 2008.

Moreover the cohabitation pact appears to be the logical outcome of the implosion of the GonziPN system of government.

GonziPN - a spell turned into a curse?

Back in March 2008, it all looked as if Lawrence Gonzi had accomplished an extraordinary feat, winning an election despite trailing in all the polls till just two weeks before D-day.

He did so campaigning on a personalised platform labelled GonziPN.

Yet the writing was already on the wall on 9 March 2008 when nail-biting results started pouring in from Ta' Qali. Gonzi ended up winning with a one-seat majority reflecting the 1,500 vote gap, which resulted in Malta's first ever relative majority government and a parliamentary bench full of minefields. 

This resulted in a lethal combination of personal pride from winning an impossible election and the reality of a one-seat majority, which included an embittered former leadership rival, John Dalli, and a coterie of new, unpredictable MPs replacing embittered veterans.

It also included Jeffrey Pullicino Orlando, a young but three-times-successfully-elected MP and former Gonzi acolyte, now embroiled in the Spin Valley controversy over the disco permit on his land in pristine Mistra. The party machinery turned him into a martyr to hunt down Sant, only to be ditched as a liability once the dust settled. 

Overlooking all this was a weakened party, diminished in its stature by a presidential campaign whose only legacy now is the much-derided GonziPN motif.

It remains unclear whether the present crisis will allow the re-emergence of the Nationalist Party as a collegial force, or whether Gonzi intends to re-contest the next election as a presidential candidate, simply backed by a party constructed in his own image.

Gonzi and the art of survival

The Prime Minister has effectively lost control of his own fate, which depends on the continued support of Jeffrey Pullicino Orlando, now formally outside the grasp of party discipline, and other backbench rebels like Franco Debono who have their own separate agendas.

Come October his government will have to struggle to keep afloat, although Gonzi has once again proven himself as the master in the art of political survival. 

The "coalition" agreement is a clear indication his government intends to present its last budget before the general election. This could be an indication that the government's hope of recovering popularity hinges on a popular budget.

But this raises the risk of a populist temptation, throwing away the fiscal prudence which positively characterised Gonzi's years in office in a desperate attempt to win back voters. This strategy may well backfire among discerning pro-PN voters who actually admired Gonzi for not going down the road of fiscal irresponsibility.

Surviving the summer against all odds means there will be no election before next October.

Clearly Gonzi's blame-game strategy has worked. None of the rebels seem willing to push things to the point of being held responsible for bringing down the government.

In the comfort zone of the summer recess, Gonzi has also used his party to appear strong with the rebels, pushing them to the brink and banking on their unwillingness to bring him down.

Only last Sunday Gonzi sent a very clear message to the rebel MPs: that he will return to parliament with the intention of completing his mandate, putting the onus of bringing the government down on them.

By refusing to call a confidence vote himself, he has made it clear to backbenchers that their only choice is either to support him or to vote for an Opposition motion of no-confidence, or even against the next budget - something which in itself would prove collusion between Labour and the rebel MPs.

But his strength is limited by the exigency of completing the mandate. After projecting himself as a strong leader in the past weeks, Gonzi had to swallow his pride again and accepting a humiliating pact with Pullicino Orlando, which effectively puts him at the mercy of an MP accountable to nobody but himself. 

Spinning this reality as a 'coalition' similar to that between David Cameron and Nick Clegg defies the reality that, unlike junior coalition partners in European governments, Pullicino Orlando does not have to face the verdict of voters in the next election.

The other risk of this strategy is a daily pantomime in which backbenchers constantly belittle Gonzi, feeling free to attack Gonzi's leadership and prominent members of the administration, without committing the mortal sin of bringing the government down.

By resigning from the PN, Pullicino Orlando has taken things even further by becoming completely unaccountable to the party on whose ticket he got elected.

Moreover Gonzi's weakness is further confirmed by his reluctance to convene parliament now and immediately ask parliament to confirm confidence in the new "coalition" arrangement.

Gonzi's legitimacy to govern cannot be challenged as long as the government is able to stand the test of a confidence vote in parliament. But it now clear the PN has lost its self-sufficient majority due to Pullicino Orlando's decision to become an independent MP. Gonzi cannot afford to ignore this new political reality till October. By refraining to go to parliament to certify this new reality, Gonzi is himself creating uncertainty. 

This constant squabbling takes away the focus from the economy and jobs, to internal squabbling that is continuously eroding government support. But the PM could be banking on the revulsion of the moderate or apathetic electorate, particularly new voters, against the antics of backbenchers and the Opposition.

Although Gonzi may in some ways use the current situation to his advantage, the current meltdown has cast serious doubts on his handling of 2008 electoral campaign. The way the party used Pullicino Orlando to discredit Alfred Sant when it later turned out that Sant's claims were legitimate, exposes the electoral short-termism typical of Lawrence Gonzi's electoral strategies.

This short-termism characterised the 2008 campaign in actions like the secret pre-electoral agreement with Armier squatters, while Gonzi publicly promised to redress the country's environmental deficit.

And after having told John Dalli he could not have a minister under investigation without referring clearly to which investigation he was referring to, he publicly absolved this rival of 'wrongdoing' on the eve of the 2008 election, in a bid to ephemerally recompose unity in the moment of need.

Pullicino Orlando - rebel turned kingmaker

For once Pullicino Orlando's agenda appears to be crystal-clear: by calling on his party to expel Cachia Caruana he went in for a battle, which he knew he would lose.

His task was further weakened by the lack of any clear proof of 'collusion' between Cachia Caruana and Labour officials as he originally alleged. When the PN failed to approve his motion, this became the alibi for him to abandon the parliamentary group and justify his break with the PN.

But Pullicino Orlando was clearly unwilling to go the whole hog, by pulling the plug on Gonzi's moribund government.

Surely he has emerged politically stronger through his pact with Gonzi. From a rebel and estranged MP he now finds himself promoted to Gonzi's 'junior coalition partner' who must be consulted before presenting important bills.

The risk for Gonzi is that Pullicino Orlando already had a reputation for ambush and acute brinkmanship. He can only expect the worse in the MP's disproportionate role of junior coalition partner.

For although the pact binds Pullicino Orlando to support government as long as it enacts the 2008 electoral programme, he is still free to interpret the programme and keep Gonzi dependent on his support. And he is now free to attack the Nationalist party to which he no longer belongs.

Although voters may see delusions of grandeur and signs of an overblown ego in the MP's antics, Pullicino Orlando is no longer accountable to his electors by having decided not to contest the next election.

What has surely weakened Pullicino Orlando was the re-evocation of the Mistra scandal by the same party officials who defended him in 2008.

Ironically Mistra, which was part of PL ammunition in 2008, was exhumed by Gordon Pisani who questioned Pullicino Orlando's credibility in the days preceding the coalition agreement.

Joseph Muscat: waiting in vain?

Recent events have exposed the sense of urgency felt by Joseph Muscat to accelerate the fall of the current government.

Over the past years as GonziPN imploded in its contradictions, on the other side of the political Rubicon one of the greatest political experiments in Maltese political history was taking place: a "Nationalist-lite" Labour party that promises gain but no pain, led by a young leader bent on creating a rival presidential coalition, reopening the doors to the party's old guard without losing its seductive appeal for disillusioned Nationalists, an experiment which has all the trappings of another GonziPN, or MuscatPL.

Current polls indicate a victory way beyond Gonzi's one-seat majority and an election now would ensure that Muscat would not face great problems in managing his parliamentary majority.

Just as Gonzi seems desperate to cling on to power at all costs, Muscat appears desperate to force an election as quickly as possible, depriving Gonzi the chance to present a Budget and close the legislature on a higher note.

For months Muscat correctly observed that the current crisis confirms his prediction that government and PN is imploding. But he did not stop here, letting his party being dragged in the internal affairs of PN under the false impression that it would accelerate Gonzi's demise.

The PL found itself dragged in the saga through testimonies of Joe Mizzi and Karmenu Vella, which did not contain any conclusive evidence against Cachia Caruana. Labour media took an active role by broadcasting a secret recording of Cachia Caruana speaking about Guido de Marco's misgivings on Brigadier Maurice Calleja's resignation, and that this fomented Meinrad Calleja's resentment for him.

But in so doing Labour went overboard, going to the extreme of saying that in the recording Cachia Caruana "implicated" De Marco in the attempted murder.

The numerous appearances of former Mistra villain Pullicino Orlando on the Labour media also smack of political opportunism, and sharply contrast with Alfred Sant's description of Pullicino Orlando as "politically and morally corrupt".

The coalition agreement seems to have dashed Labour's hopes of an early election. While Labour's strategy of exposing the instability of the government seems to be constantly paying off, the ultimate goal of actually bringing the government down remains elusive and Labour risks undermining its credibility by pushing things too far, instead of taking a back seat and let GonziPN implode.

John Dalli casts his shadow

The strongly-worded speech delivered by Dalli to the executive on Tuesday was symptomatic of failure to re-unite the party after the 2004 leadership contest, something which is once again returning to haunt Gonzi.

By calling him as a witness in his case against Cachia Caruana, Pullicino Orlando provided Dalli with a political platform, which the former contender gladly accepted.

Although his testimony was not directly related to the motion to expel Cachia Caruana, it provided Dalli with the opportunity to re-exhume his own recriminations and to fire new accusations linked to the hacking of his emails.

While allegations about a "team" within the party working against him can be seen as a sign of sour grapes, it also confirms that the wound opened by the acrimonious leadership contest in 2004 remains wide open and was never healed in a substantial way, except briefly before 2008 election.

Not only was John Dalli not offered a leading role in the party as Guido de Marco was offered by Fenech Adami in 1978, but Dalli was forced to resign on the premise that the Prime Minister could not accept someone "under investigation", notwithstanding the fact that the nature of the investigation was never revealed to him, and which later turned out to be a fabricated private investigator's report.

Probably the lack of chemistry between the two aspirant leaders prevented a replica of the De Marco-Fenech Adami tandem. But it is clear that the wound was allowed to fester for far too long.

The PN's decision to facilitate Dalli's speech by teleconferencing his speech to the executive and Gonzi's willingness to meet Dalli on Thursday could signify a sense of fear and unease on what the veteran politician could do in the future.

It also shows that Gonzi's decision to remove Dalli from Cabinet in 2009 to 'promote' him to EU Commissioner backfired, as it did not silence the former minister. Had Dalli stayed, Gonzi's government would have had a greater element of collegiality and would have dispelled the perception that it was only composed of die-hard loyalists.

But Dalli's persistent lamentations, even after accepting the Commissioner's job presented by Gonzi himself, suggests he never reconciled himself to the 2004 defeat.

Dalli's decision to raise his own issues concurrently with JPO and other backbenchers now raises the question of what his real intentions are: is he making a desperate call for reform in the party, or is he exacting his revenge by damaging Gonzi close to elections and letting Labour reap the fruits?

Franco Debono obscured?

As the main protagonist of the first cycle of the Gonzi crisis, Debono has seen his visibility obscured by Pullicino Orlando's antics. The attention-seeking MP might be tempted to try everything to recover centre-stage.

Unlike Pullicino Orlando, Debono has not given up on appealing to party structures in a bid to reverse the party's decision to condemn him for voting with the Opposition on the Carm Mifsud Bonnici resignation motion, and prevent him from contesting the next election.

His alibi for threatening the government's stability would be Austin Gatt remaining minister after October. Debono has already gone on record saying that he would not vote for the next Budget if Gatt remains minister. He made this declaration fully knowing that back in January the PM has already said that he wants Gatt to move out of his ministry to lead the party's electoral campaign.

By saying that he would not vote for government unless Gatt leaves ministry, Debono is making it more difficult for Gonzi to transfer Gatt from ministry to the party machine.

For any decision by Gonzi to transfer Gatt from Cabinet to party now would be interpreted as a sign of weakness, surrendering to Franco Debono's antics.

Still, Debono's Achilles heal remains his fear of being blamed for the government's demise.

So far Debono had no qualms embarrassing the government by voting out one of its most prominent ministers, but he always fell in line or at least abstained when the government's future was at stake.