Brussels will not wait and neither should we

After 22 years in the EU, it is high time we adopt a more cohesive framework to influence EU policy early.

Our late reaction to the impact of the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) on Malta is a telling example, which deserves a wider airing because it points to a broader pattern. It is a symptom of Malta’s reactive approach to EU affairs. We wait for Brussels to act and then scramble to manage the consequences, rather than anticipate and seek to influence the direction of policy decisions.

ETS has been on the agenda for years. The EU’s ETS Directive was adopted in 2003 and launched in 2005. It went through three phases, stretching to 2020 with its extension to transport, the very part that hits an island state hardest. It was tabled in the Fit for 55 package in 2021.

We therefore had more than two decades to understand the mechanism, and over five years to anticipate its impact. The costs now being quoted were entirely predictable for a country that imports almost everything and where connectivity is a lifeline.

The amendments just tabled by Malta’s MEPs are to be welcomed, as are various related efforts from representative organisations. The fact that both Labour and Nationalist MEPs have tabled proposals, despite doing so separately, shows the concern is national. This is positive but going forward, the real dividend will come if all MEPs coordinate as one team when the national interest is at stake.

As a small peripheral state, we cannot afford to react only when an EU directive is already hitting our costs. Better late than never is not a strategy, it is at best a mitigating measure. We need early detection in Brussels, otherwise we risk sounding like an echo.

Malta has a layered EU coordination system that reflects valuable domestic work but it is predominantly ‘Malta talking to Malta’ about the EU and not ‘Malta talking to the EU’.

The government-to-EU coordination sits elsewhere, namely, the EU Secretariat in the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry for Foreign and European Affairs, the line ministries, and our Permanent Representation in Brussels. For day-to-day legislative business, this machine works.

However, it is well known that in Brussels, 80% of the lobbying battle is won before a proposal is published. By the time Fit for 55 landed in 2021, the impact assessment, the policy options, and the derogations had all been shaped over two years of workshops, and expert groups and stakeholder papers. We needed to be more present and more vocal at that point when early engagement can make the biggest difference.

In pushing for more upstream influence, we need a dedicated set-up for more EU strategic presence. Crucially, it cannot be the government only. Any such set-up must be formally coordinated with private sector representative bodies. This set-up should have three functions: Early intelligence, coalition building and participation.

• Early intelligence: The job is to map the Commission Work Programme and the preparatory studies two years ahead and issue a quarterly ‘What will hit Malta’ risk register to Cabinet, parliament, and social partners. ETS would never have been a surprise had this been effectively in place.

• Coalition building: Small states never win alone. We will not make headway by arguing that we are special, we need to argue on points of principle. This is best achieved by means of a permanent alliance-building function for islands, peripheries, and maritime economies.

• Presence and participation: A bigger presence of Maltese technical experts within selected Commission DGs, key European parliament secretariats, EU institutions and business associations, is crucial. This would cost a fraction of what ETS compliance alone is costing the Maltese economy in 2026.

Beyond compliance, we need representation that broadens our presence and participation where it matters most. Likewise, we need to ensure a coordinated link between this dedicated setup and all our MEPs.

Ad hoc lobbying won’t work

If we continue to rely on late, ad hoc lobbying when costs are already reflected in invoices, we will always be asking for tardy amendments and derogations. If instead we invest in permanent, professional, joint government-private presence in Brussels, we will be better placed to influence debates from inception and follow them through. Playing defence, as we seem to be doing today, is a very different matter.

Compliance and influence are distinct functions requiring very different skills sets, and we need to be well placed to do both. Brussels will not wait and neither should we.