Banning kids from social media won’t fix it. Here’s what will

Malta hasn’t joined them yet, but from Australia to a growing list of European countries keep reaching for the same policy—ban children from social media and call it decisive action against Big Tech. It isn’t. The three things that are actually wrong with social media have nothing to do with age.

Problem one: Nobody knows who is posting

Remove under-16s, and social platforms remain flooded with bots faking public consensus. This triggers the ‘Spiral of Silence’. Aggressive, automated accounts make fringe viewpoints appear dominant, intimidating real users into staying silent. A 45-year-old is misled by this tactic just as easily as a teenager.

The tools to address this are already in place. Under eIDAS 2.0, every EU state must issue a

digital identity wallet by the end of 2026, and the European Commission’s own age-verification “mini-wallet” lets anyone prove they’re over 13, 15, or 18 by cryptographic proof. No name or ID handed over to any platform. Verifying age, verifies existence. One account per citizen prevents mass automated account creation. Platforms receive unique identifiers to block repeat offenders, while unmasking real identities requires court orders, not platform discretion.

One verified account per citizen could transform social media. Why is the EU prioritising age verification over this critical accountability layer?

Problem two: Media companies answer for what they air and print. Platforms don’t

Traditional media outlets face immediate legal consequences for publishing defamatory content. Social platforms face almost none, even when their algorithms and bots actively amplify identical falsehoods to millions.

The Digital Services Act fails to fix this liability gap because it relies on a passive ‘notice-and-action’ framework. Instead of holding platforms editorially accountable when content is published, the DSA merely requires them to operate a complaints desk after damage is already done.

The Digital Services Act must go further for systemic platforms, treating them with a level of oversight and duty of care similar to banks. Given that social media platforms have now been operating for over 20 years, such structural regulation is long overdue. Within the DSA’s own framework, systemic platforms generate clear systemic risks to public discourse, mental health, and democratic processes. These are risks that cannot be managed by passive moderation alone, but require strict, institutional-level accountability akin to financial system regulation.

Enforcement is weak. The commission’s landmark €120 million fine against X in December 2025 represents a tiny fraction of the 6% of revenues ceiling. For Big Tech, these fines are an acceptable cost of doing business rather than a true deterrent. When platforms profit from viral lies and face only token penalties, the question arises: Is current regulation protecting European citizens, or shielding Big Tech?

Problem three: Addiction isn’t about age. It’s about design

Solving the first two issues exposes the weakness of banning social media entirely. Without bot-driven outrage and disinformation, the compulsive pull of these platforms fades. The real issue is the addictive architecture—infinite scroll, autoplay, and notifications engineered like a slot machine. Regulators are already addressing this. California’s Protecting Our Kids from Social Media Addiction Act limits algorithmic feeds, and the European Commission has cited TikTok’s design as a breach of the Digital Services Act. These solutions require right-sizing regulation, not banning users.

The question nobody’s asking

Three things need to happen, and none require banning a single user. Verified identity needs its second layer switched on—real liability. Platforms need to move from a notice and-action desk to something closer to the liability, a media company carries for what it publishes or broadcasts. And addictive design needs regulating directly, the way California and the European Commission have already started doing.

All three are within reach. None are finished. The real scandal isn’t a teenager encountering upsetting content. The scandal is that the tools to fix the feed already exist and remain unused.

Governments reach for bans because they grab headlines. The real fix asks more of the people in power than a press conference does. But there is also a less comfortable explanation than simple political inertia. In December 2025, the US State Department sanctioned Thierry Breton—the DSA’s own architect—and four anti-disinformation campaigners, accusing them of pressuring American platforms to censor US speech. The sanctions landed weeks after Brussels fined X €120 million.

France’s foreign minister said Europe “cannot let the rules governing their digital space be imposed by others”. Finishing the accountability layer would mean testing that pressure directly, not just absorbing it.

Banning children isn’t policy. It’s a way to look tough on Big Tech without ever testing whether Brussels wants to be tough on Washington.