TCNs: Taxing the dependency, we cannot afford to lose

A recent Financial Times chart asks a deceptively simple question: What happens when migrants stop coming? 

During the first half of 2026, real GDP grew b y 4.4% while employment increased by 4.6%, but labour productivity declined by 0.2% (File Photo)
During the first half of 2026, real GDP grew b y 4.4% while employment increased by 4.6%, but labour productivity declined by 0.2% (File Photo)

Using United Nations population projections, it compares the working-age populations of advanced economies under normal migration assumptions and a scenario with no migration. By 2060, Canada’s working-age population would be around a third smaller than under its baseline projection. Australia, Britain and the United States would also experience substantial differences. 

Malta is absent from the chart. Yet few countries have organised their recent economic expansion around imported labour as extensively as we have. It is tempting to imagine Malta below Canada, but that would require a comparable projection. Its omission should make us ask what such an exercise would reveal. 

The chart published by the Financial Times
The chart published by the Financial Times

Consider the numbers. Between 2015 and 2025, employment in Malta increased by approximately 130,000 people. Of these, around 106,000 were foreign workers. Put differently, for every 100 additional people working in our economy, about 81 came from abroad. This is not an argument against migration. Those workers helped businesses expand, supported public finances and delivered services on which residents depend. It is an acknowledgement that our growth model relies on a continuing supply of people from elsewhere. 

Demography compounds the exposure. Malta’s fertility rate stood at just 1.01 children per woman in 2024, the lowest in the European Union and far below the replacement rate of roughly 2.1. The consequences will unfold as smaller generations enter the labour market and larger ones retire. Migration can offset some of this imbalance, but the scale of our dependence makes it a structural variable in economic planning. Malta has sustained employment growth by continuously replenishing its workforce from abroad. 

The economic mechanism is familiar. Growth attracts workers, additional workers generate demand for housing, transport and services, and that demand creates further employment. This produces a self-reinforcing cycle in which economic expansion requires ever more people. It can sustain impressive GDP figures without corresponding improvements in productivity. More importantly, each additional worker places demands on infrastructure and public services, creating pressures that require further investment and, frequently, additional employment. The economy grows, but its dependence on expanding the workforce remains largely unchanged. 

The latest figures reinforce the concern. In the first half of 2026, real GDP grew by 4.4% while employment increased by 4.6%. Labour productivity consequently declined by approximately 0.2%. These are six-month figures, not a verdict on every industry or on the whole decade. Nevertheless, they illustrate the distinction between expanding an economy and deepening its productive capacity. More people are producing more output collectively, but not necessarily more per worker. In a small, densely populated country, that difference matters. 

Our model therefore contains two vulnerabilities pulling in opposite directions. If migration continues at the pace needed to sustain labour-intensive growth, pressures on land, housing, roads, utilities and public services persist. If migration slows sharply, businesses organised around the availability of additional workers may struggle to expand or even maintain operations. We have spent years debating the first risk through the language of congestion and population growth. The Financial Times chart forces us to confront the second. 

There is no guarantee that international labour mobility will collapse. Migration flows are shaped by policy, wages, networks and economic conditions, not demography alone. But ageing societies across Europe and beyond will increasingly need workers. Malta will compete with larger economies offering higher wages, established career paths and, sometimes, clearer routes to settlement. The question is no longer simply how many workers we wish to admit. It is whether those we need will continue to choose Malta, and whether they will stay. 

An abrupt slowdown would not simply reduce headline growth. It would change the economics of everyday services. Care homes, hospitals, hotels, construction firms and transport operators would compete for fewer workers. Wages could rise, which would be welcome where pay is inadequate, but without productivity improvements some costs would pass to households and other businesses. Tax receipts and social contributions could grow more slowly just as an ageing population increases demand for care. This is a supply-side risk, not merely a demographic statistic. 

Recent parliamentary figures add an important fiscal dimension. Third country nationals contributed €110.4 million in social security payments in 2025, accounting for 20.6% of the total. They also paid €176.8 million in income tax, approximately 12% of receipts. These figures do not establish their net lifetime fiscal contribution, which would require accounting for public services and future entitlements. They demonstrate how deeply foreign labour is embedded in the financing of our present system. In 2024, roughly 63,500 of 81,000 employed TCNs earned below the national median wage. This is a workforce contributing substantially while often occupying modestly paid positions. 

Against this background, Budget 2027 deserves a searching examination. Government has legitimate reasons to make economic activity reflect its infrastructure costs. Work permit application fees for TCNs are rising from €600 to €800 in January, accompanied by a €400 annual infrastructure contribution, with expected revenue of €80 million. Yet what will these charges change? A higher price for labour may encourage substitution towards technology where alternatives exist. Where they do not, the charge may reduce workers’ net returns, raise employers’ costs or feed into prices, depending on who pays it. A fee is a price signal, not a productivity strategy. 

The restrictions on certain benefits raise a related issue. Changes affecting free transport, childcare and other entitlements for those without long-term residence are expected to produce €46 million in savings and revenue. Eligibility distinctions may be defended on fiscal grounds, but their effects on retention deserve attention. Transport and childcare influence whether people can work, remain employed and establish stable lives. When experienced workers leave, employers lose accumulated knowledge and incur recruitment and training costs. An economy reliant on migration should be careful about creating unnecessary turnover. 

The reduction to 25% in the tax rate on qualifying retained or reinvested profits for smaller companies moves in a more promising direction. It recognises that businesses need incentives to build capital rather than simply add staff. Existing schemes for digitalisation and automation also matter. Yet the budget’s roughly €324 million in quantified new revenue and savings measures is more visible than any comparable, integrated programme for changing how firms produce. Infrastructure investment is planned, but the connection between new charges, measurable productivity outcomes and reduced labour intensity remains unclear. 

This is the missing supply-side agenda. Firms need access to finance for machinery, software and automation, support for better management and incentives to train employees. Small enterprises require assistance to redesign processes, not only grants to purchase equipment. Education and vocational pathways must equip the next generation for higher-value work, while adult learning should help current workers move into more productive roles. Infrastructure planning must anticipate economic demand rather than respond after capacity is exhausted. These reforms are complementary. Technology without skills, or skills without investment, deliver limited results. 

Migration policy itself should become more precise in its economic objectives without becoming dismissive of the people involved. Malta needs healthcare workers, technical specialists and workers in essential services. It also needs to distinguish genuine labour shortages from business models sustained by permanently cheap recruitment. Better data on vacancies, wages, turnover and sectoral productivity could guide decisions. Improving housing, transport, working conditions and routes to long-term stability would support retention, while productivity incentives could gradually reduce the number of additional workers required for each increment of output. 

None of this, appeals for shutting the door on migration. That would risk damaging the economy and the public services it sustains. Nor can automation replace every job, or higher productivity remove demographic pressures altogether. The aim is resilience—an economy capable of growing even when labour inflows moderate, and of accommodating those who arrive without continuously degrading quality of life. We must reduce dependence on migration as the default mechanism of expansion while recognising its continuing economic and human contribution. 

The Financial Times chart is a warning about what happens when a country’s workforce depends on decisions made beyond its borders. Malta’s precise position would require a comparable demographic projection; it cannot be calculated from a decade of employment data alone. But our exposure is visible. We have built an economy that needs more people to keep growing, while struggling with the consequences of accommodating them. Budget 2027 puts a higher price on that dependence. The harder task is to reduce it. 

We should undertake that transformation while workers are still coming, rather than discover its urgency when they no longer do.