Chronicles of his defeat, foretold: Grech and the future of the PN

Bernard Grech’s mission was to reduce the gap with Labour to become competitive for 2027. He clearly failed and this should make him reconsider his position as party leader. But Grech insists he wants to stay on. Is he prolonging the party’s agony?

That the PN had no chance of winning this election, in which it started with a 35,000-vote deficit, was never in question.

But after a decade of Labour in government, the PN was expected to make some inroads.

The signs of another Labour landslide were all there, with surveys constantly exposing Grech’s Sisyphean predicament, possibly demotivating potential PN voters in a country where the electorate tends to rally behind the winning team, and where very few vote tactically to reduce the gap.

Reducing the gap was essentially the PN’s rallying cry in this election, simply because few even considered the possibility of the party actually implementing its manifesto, which although refreshing in some aspect also failed in giving the party a strong identity.

And the party’s quest to narrow the gap in itself could have backfired in a country where political parties are largely considered as a means to win government, as the PN itself was perceived before losing power in 2013.

Abstention as an alternative

By acknowledging the obvious and calling on voters to reduce the gap, Grech may well have further demotivated a segment of past PN voters who lost hope and stayed at home.

Abstention gave disgruntled Labour voters another option to voting PN in their hope of clipping Robert Abela’s wings. In the end it may well be that these two segments of voters cancelled each other out to Labour’s benefit, providing a parking space for voters: an alternative to voting for the PN.

Grech thus failed in projecting himself as an alternative prime minister and in the process, reduce the gap. To get there he had to sell an illusion that his party could still make it. This was never an easy task for a leader of a party which inherited a 35,000-vote deficit. But by accepting to lead the party in 2020, Grech had taken a commitment which he failed to deliver.

As things stand Grech – or any PN leader elected instead of him – is condemned to face the same predicament.

Had Grech managed to reduce the gap, Grech would have paved the way for a period of consolidation and renewal. He would have gained the serenity required to reshape the party into his more inclusive image.

Instead, Labour’s landslide has remained stronger than ever, and the party is back to square one, in the same spot it was in 2013 and 2017. The implications are obvious. Labour has the next election in the bag and once again the PN is faced with an uphill battle to reduce the gap, that elusive first step which is a prerequisite for any recovery.

And one major obstacle to this is the toxicity of the PN’s brand, something which Grech underestimated whenever he identified with the successes of past PN governments.

The poisoned chalice

Crucially the result robs the party of any serenity, reopens old factional divides and raises the prospect of yet another brutal leadership election, for the party statute makes it mandatory for the party to hold a leadership contest after an electoral defeat. Grech can recontest, but he will not be doing so from a position of strength.

But it remains doubtful whether an alternative candidate would be willing to drink from the poisoned chalice of leading a demoralised party. Grech could sacrifice himself once again; at least until Roberta Metsola is available to take his place. One big advantage for Grech is that the party may not be in the mood of a third leadership change in just three years. But the question PN members will be asking is whether Grech has the ability to turn the tide. And they are bound to become impatient, especially because Adrian Delia himself was removed for his failure to cut the gap in MEP elections.

It also raises the prospect of a bloodbath which would further weaken a party which has yet to resolve its identity problem. For underlying the party’s problem is an existential question; what does it stand for in 2022? In the absence of a solid identity which matches the aspirations of a changed Maltese society, the party is condemned to political irrelevance.

Remaining a big tent party, the PN’s tent under which its various factions co-exist keeps shrinking and becoming claustrophobic. Can these ideological divisions still be retained under one big tent?

And then again... the PN’s own factional divides only obscure deeper ones rooted in different mind-frames.

A wasted decade

The repeat of 2013 and 2017 raises one crucial question. Has the party wasted a whole decade during which it could have sorted out its mess and found a sense of purpose, which is so essential in motivating activists?

The roots of the current mess goes back to 2003, when the party’s disparate electorate was held together by the EU membership battle-cry. Ever since then, the party failed in mobilising the same coalition of voters. For it is clear that this time around a segment of former PN voters have stayed at home, offsetting any abstainers on the Labour side.

And the reason for this is that the party failed even the basic task of retaining all of its 2017 voters, let alone recover switchers lost in 2013. At the root of the problem is the PN’s toxic brand, a factor amplified by Labour’s strong propaganda machine but which is mostly attributable to the party’s reluctance in radically changing itself in to a modern popular party which can communicate with both working-class voters and the various segments of the middle class.

In this sense, Grech’s soft approach may well have come across as less divisive but his balancing act not to alienate any lobby by making bold proposals on issues like low wages and planning, has not captured the imagination of voters.

And was it worth changing leader midway in this legislature when the result remained the same? While one may argue that the party risked losing with an even larger margin had Delia remained at the helm, this may well have left a residue of bad blood which further hampered the party’s organisational abilities.

Moreover, the defeat risks re-opening the wound, with Delia supporters feeling vindicated. Even activists who expected the PN to continue its anti-corruption crusade with the same energy as before 2017 may also feel vindicated, because the party has actually lost a segment of its 2017 voters.

In such a scenario the party may be tempted to once again put the cart before the horse, by choosing a new leader without addressing the existential threat it faces.