Something’s got to give

A lot of Scots – certainly the majority who voted for the SNP at the last election – are unhappy with the same status quo, and want it changed... This is after all what democracy has always been about – the legal right to get rid of political administrations when you want them to go

Allow me to state up front that I don’t have any real interest in the outcome of next week’s Scottish independence referendum. In the very literal sense of the word ‘interest’, by the way. Whether it is Queen Elizabeth II or Alex Salmond I to grace the coins of an as-yet uncertain future Scottish currency... I’d be lying if I said it made a big difference to me in my personal life. (Well, perhaps not. I’d go with Salmond myself… but only because he’d look a little like Alfred Hitchcock in profile, and it would go well with all the scaremongering). Other than that I neither gain nor lose from the outcome. I am disinterested in the strictly judicial sense of the word.

But interest for its own sake? That’s another matter. Personally I have found the entire Scottish independence issue little short of fascinating as a spectacle… and it grows more fascinating even as the possible result becomes less predictable. In fact, things have now reached a stage when either outcome – Aye or Nay – will be equally fascinating, and may very well usher in all but identical repercussions, too.

So even if there is no officially independent Scotland in two weeks’ time, something tells me the only ones cheering will be the Scots.

Let’s start with the implications of a ‘Yes’ victory – now seemingly a possibility for the first time. A Yougov poll last Sunday pointed towards an overall 51% majority… only to be almost immediately superseded by a new poll placing ‘No’ ahead by a whisker. Leaving aside doubts about methodology and the high number of unknowns: the turnaround itself is little short of remarkable, when you consider that ‘No’ was ahead by 14 points just a few weeks ago.

Almost overnight, British newspapers across roughly the full mainstream spectrum have all simultaneously switched gear. After weeks of apocalyptic predictions on a daily basis, they suddenly stopped to ask themselves what might actually happen in the event of the unthinkable. (The Guardian, for instance, yesterday ran a feature entitled: ‘What would Scottish independence really mean’? – so presumably, we can now ignore all its previous articles which claimed to answer the same question…).

As for the answer, I will leave it to the Ayes and the Nays to slog it out for themselves with a good old-fashioned clash of steel at Hadrian’s Wall. What interests me more than arguments concerning currency, oil reserves, the fate of the Union Jack and all that, is the possibility of international fall-out. And it looks like I’m not the only one interested.

Clearly there is concern in Brussels that the ripple effect of a ‘Yes’ victory on 18 September might be felt in Catalunya, the Basque regions of Spain and France, and possibly other divided EU member states as well. (There has even been talk of an independent Padania in northern Italy, for instance). Placed in the context of widespread mistrust of the European Commission in the countries hardest hit by the Eurozone crisis… which just happen to include Spain and Italy… we may conceivably be on the threshold of a wave of fragmentation, within an EU that seems hell-bent on federalisation instead.

Perhaps that is an exaggeration, but the Commission seems to be taking the threat seriously. It has stated – without any visible legal leg to stand on – that an independent Scotland would have to re-apply to join the EU, and that this may take five years. The Commission did not elaborate on precisely why a renegotiation of Scotland’s political rapport with three other countries – England, Wales and Northern Ireland – should have any bearing on the status of its current EU membership. Nor did it specify whether the rest of the UK would also have to reapply to join (after all, the UK’s membership package had been negotiated with four countries in mind, not three. What’s sauce for yer haggis is sauce for yer Yorkshire pudding, and so on).

In any case: seeing as how the same Commission is on its way out anyway, and will not be around to take the decisions when they really count… I think it is safe to conclude that the EC’s position is only intended to add pressure to a ‘No’ campaign it is clearly (though by what right is slightly less clear) backing.

Not, mind you, that I don’t see the Commission’s cause for concern. History time and again illustrates how events leading to the dismantling of old structures (and the creation of new ones) will invariably upset a comfortable system that was built – unwisely – on the presumption that the status quo will last forever.

Yet this, I would have thought, is the crux of the entire matter. It takes us back to the reason why the referendum is being held in the first place. A lot of Scots – certainly the majority who voted for the SNP at the last election – are unhappy with the same status quo, and want it changed. To respond by simply defending the existing political realities as the only ones desirable (or even possible) is just not good enough an answer. Those realities may work out very conveniently for the current powers that be; but if they don’t cut the mustard with the electorate, the electorate will be fully justified in dismantling them.

This is after all what democracy has always been about – the legal right to get rid of political administrations when you want them to go.

What we are looking at, then, is an uncomfortable glitch in the otherwise laboriously constructed structures of the EU. Though built on the backs of member states which are all democratic, the EU itself seems to have fundamental problems with the concept of direct democracy. This is but the latest in a series of national referendums which the Commission tried to influence from the outside. In other examples – such as when Ireland, the Netherlands and France voted against seminal EU treaties – the response was to hold subsequent referendums until the desired result was obtained.

By a huge coincidence, this ‘desired result’ was a simple continuation of the status quo, every single time.

I’m not sure if ‘panic’ is the right word to describe the EU’s reaction to the latest threat to its apple cart. At the very least, it was concerned enough to impart an unsubtle message to be picked up by the press (and, by extension, the Scottish voter). ‘Vote for independence at your own risk’.

In the rest of the UK, on the other hand... let’s just say I am reminded of a certain Smiths song that went: “panic on the streets of London, Birmingham, Carlyle, Dundee, Humberside, etc.” This was in a sense the hallmark of the Better Together campaign, which from day one invested heavily in fear of the unknown… even when polls indicated a comfortable ‘No’ majority. Since the latest polls upset the tune has however changed: now, the British government scrambles to piece together a last-minute devolution package that would, in theory, give the Scots what they want without actually breaking up the Union.

Details are filtering in even as I write: “the three largest UK political parties have agreed to fast-track a deal on new tax and welfare powers for the Scottish parliament, which include greater income tax powers and the potential devolution of control over a wide range of social benefits, etc.”

Evidence enough, I would think, of how terrified the United Kingdom has now become of the very real possibility that it might no longer exist as a unified country by the end of the month. And there are specific fear factors for all parties concerned. The loss of Scottish constituencies would de facto castrate the British Labour Party’s hopes of ever winning another election again. The Conservatives would have accidentally engineered the demolition of the very thing they were supposed to ‘conserve’. I don’t know what would happen to the Liberal Democrats, but in any case can’t think of them in a worse position than they are now.

So all in all, I think their collective panic is justified.

This brings us to the implications of a ‘No’ win in two weeks’ time… which by the way, remains the likeliest outcome, at least insofar as official stats are concerned. But whatever the margin of defeat, Scottish nationalists would still be in a position to claim victory. They would not face their supporters empty-handed: already they have wrested considerable political power from London, just by standing their ground. And in the likely event of a high turnout and a close result, the stage will have been set for endless other attempts to stand ground in future.

In brief, the Scots will be left with a permanent negotiation trump card in their hand, which they can use at will to extract ever greater powers from the rest of the Union. There is also the curious paradox that a ‘No’ result would also immediately give Scottish nationalists at least part of what they have been consistently asking for since the beginning: the right to use the British pound. On top of all the other newly gained devolutionary powers, there is even a case to be made that Scotland’s independence bid may be better served by a ‘No’ win than a ‘Yes’ at this stage.

But that is for another time. What I find truly fascinating is that the international fallout mentioned above – the one that concerns the Commission so much, remember? – will not be that different in either scenario. Separatist aspirations within other European territories may well be bolstered by what many will regard as the success of Alex Salmond’s tough negotiating stance. They may conclude that it’s worth the effort to at least try and achieve independence… even with all the odds stacked against you, and even if you fail. Look what it already achieved for Scotland, and they haven’t even voted yet…

The only certainty to emerge is that the status quo itself will have to change. The United Kingdom after 18 September will not be exactly the same UK as it was before that date. The balance of power will have been permanently affected: much more so with a ‘Yes’, true, but also with a ‘No’. For the same reason it will be harder for the structures of the EU to forge ahead with their own visions of a more federalised Europe, when the flavour of the month seems to be devolution.

Forces are now visibly tugging in different directions. Something’s got to give.