[ANALYSIS] The PN's double-dip recession

A double dip recession generally occurs when austerity measures intended to cure a sick economy result in an even greater depression, which intesifies the downward spiral. 

Surely over the past few months the PN has managed to show signs of life by presenting itself as a compact and determined Opposition in parliament, which was able to create difficulties for government on a number of occasions. On its own, this raised expectations of a slow but steady recovery. But last week’s result has dashed these hopes away, giving the impression that the party’s attempts to re-invigorate itself during the past year have all been in vain.

Could the result itself trigger a double dip effect, ushering more internal bleeding in the years to come? 

One of the greatest fears of Nationalist strategists is that the gap between the two main parties confirmed in last week’s election fuels the perception among Nationalists that Labour is here to stay for the long haul, and has thus supplanted the PN as the country’s natural party of government.

For the best part of the past three decades, the PN came to be regarded not just as the dispensers of patronage, but it also gave its leaders the aura of statesmen... something which, in the mind of PN voters, always gives their leaders the benefit of the doubt in the face criticism.

The PN actively cultivated this perception while in power, not just by morphing party and government into a powerful electoral machine, but also by presenting its leaders as statesmen rather than simply politicians.

This was a problem faced by Sant’s Opposition, which was constantly belittled as a nuisance factor. This perception was only shaken by the defections from the Gonzi camp, which constantly eroded the PM’s authority. 

Still, among rank-and-file Nationalists, while Gonzi was endowed with the attributes of a statesman, Joseph Muscat was still regarded as an upstart with no political depth.

What happened after March 2013 dispelled some of the worst fears among Nationalist voters, some of whom feared a return to the divisive policies of Dom Mintoff’s party. 

Moreover, the PN’s apocalyptic pre-election warnings have so far been contradicted by a buoyant economy and the PL’s ability to honour its pledges to cut income tax and to reduce energy bills.  

At the same time, many of these voters were already desensitised by the PN’s own record in government, to the PN Opposition’s constant complaints of low standards of governance and lack of meritocracy. They did not cringe at Muscat’s betrayal of ‘Malta Taghna Lkoll’ simply because they were used to the same standards when the PN was in government. This is why nobody baulked at the numerous occasions when Muscat’s meritocracy mask fell.

In bed with the enemy?

Moreover, in their everyday life, many Nationalists are already getting used to the idea of a Labour government as an interlocutor rather than an adversary. Not only are more Nationalists discovering that Labourites are not the monsters depicted in Nationalist lore, but some may even find Labour more accommodating and attentive to their needs, especially in those sectors, like MEPA, where the late Gonzi administration had tightened the screws. 

Moreover, while the pro-business, pro-hunting and pro-development policies of the government may turn off that category disgruntled PN voters who may flirt with the idea of voting for AD, the PL’s ideological transformation may be viewed positively by rank-and-file PN voters who genuinely believe in privatisation and that government should interfere less in the economy. Many of these voters probably do not give a toss about hunters and overdevelopment.

Moreover, the PL has also kept its appeal among liberal PN voters by introducing civil unions and starting a discussion about decriminalisation of drug use – a strategy that could make these voters turn a blind eye on other abuses. 

Surveys carried out in the past few months show that a sizeable category of PN voters in the 2013 general election have already warmed to the Labour government. A MaltaToday survey held at the end of last year ahead of the start of the campaign showed that 6% of PN voters expressed a positive judgement on Muscat’s government.

Moreover only half of Nationalist voters expressed a completely negative judgement, with the rest expressing a so-so judgement. Moreover, even before elections, nearly 5% of PN voters claimed that they had more trust in Muscat than in Busuttil. Most of these respondents did not commit themselves on who they were going to vote.

This could indicate that after losing around a tenth of its voters before the 2013 election, the PN now risks losing another segment of its already restricted voting base without recovering any substantial amount of voters from the other side. This could force the PN into a double dip recession.

It’s already happening… in Gozo

The election results indicate that the double dip effect is already taking place in Gozo, a district in which voters tend to gravitate towards the party in government. In fact, even in 1987 it was the Gozo district which defied the trend against the entrenched Labour government. 

Scarcity of resources also makes Gozitans more dependent on traditionally strong patronage networks. 

Gozo is the only district which saw a substantial increase in turnout over corresponding elections in 2009. But while the PL increased its voters by 1,054, the PN only increased its votes by 322. Ultimately, the PL increased its lead by 1.4% to win a relative majority of 49.5%, while the PN lost 2 points dipping to 45.5%.

Even compared to the general election, the PL still managed to improve its percentage by 0.4%, despite the growth of small parties. In fact, apart from the first district where Labour increased its vote share by a minimal 0.1%, Gozo was the only district where Labour actually increased its voting share. Both parties are bound to have lost votes due to the low turnout since the past general election. But while Labour got 1,809 less votes than last year, the PN lost 2,900 votes. 

In other districts, it is harder to decipher whether Labour has gained any new votes from the PN or vice versa. For it could well be possible that any gains made by both parties from each other were counterbalanced by abstentions or votes to smaller parties, which together account for nearly 7% of the vote. 

While in the south the indications are that the PN lost a bit more to abstention than Labour, a stalemate situation reigns in the rest of Malta. Moreover, compared to 2009, the Nationalist-leaning tenth district saw Labour losing more votes than the PN despite the low turnout in this district.  

Into the wilderness?

While it is not clear whether the PN is already losing more votes to Labour, the result itself may be the final straw for some voters to defect and surrender to Joseph Muscat’s seductive appeal. 

One factor is that people generally prefer riding on the winning cart than soldiering on, especially when the army’s generals seem to be heading deeper in the wilderness. Another risk is that due to his role as Gonzi’s sidekick in the 2013 general election, Simon Busuttil has already acquired a reputation of a loser, something that happened to Sant after losing the 1998 election, the EU referendum and the subsequent election.

One radical choice for the party would be that of replacing Busuttil by a new leader.  But this may well further lacerate and weaken the party. Moreover, there is no obvious replacement for Busuttil and both deputy leaders carry their signature on the defeat. An unwritten pact still seems to unite the PN’s troika. Moreover, over the past months Busuttil has adopted an inclusive style of leadership, which makes it even more difficult to solely blame him for the bad result.

Busuttil had also given himself one realisable target: that of electing three seats of six and by a stroke of luck, he has managed to fulfil it.

Neither is there any way to counter the government’s power of incumbency and the inevitable losses to a party which holds the reins of government and patronage.

As the Panini sticker album episode also demonstrated, singling out anyone appointed by Muscat simply serves to alienate their relatives and friends.

The only way for the PN to remain a viable force is that of exploiting any contradictions in Labour’s new hegemonic block by becoming attractive to traditional Labour voters. In some ways, the PN has a lot to learn about how Muscat’s movement became attractive to a number of centre-right voters. 

One problem is that Busuttil’s baggage makes it difficult for him to make inroads in the rival camp. 

Still, Busuttil has shown moments of political wisdom, like supporting the nomination of Marie Louise Coleiro Preca as President. This was the first time that the party in Opposition supported a nomination made by the governments from its own rank. On its own, this episode disproves Labour’s mantra that the Opposition is always negative.

But the fact remains that throughout the campaign, the PN failed to convey this message with conviction.

In fact, any gain made in presenting a constructive Opposition may have been dampened by a campaign in which the party was forced to galvanise core voters in last week’s election. In so doing, the PN entrenched itself by resurrecting a tribal identity, which will put off any voter from the other side.   

Moreover, the negativity card is unfairly used to denigrate any legitimate scrutiny by the Opposition like its demand for the publication of the agreement between government and IPP concessionary Henley & Partners.

But the PN needs to find a way of packaging its criticism in a way that will convince the electorate that its aim is not simply to make life difficult for the party in government.

Tapping disgruntlement

An analysis of the vote confirms that the PL is facing pockets of disgruntlement among both switchers and traditional Labour voters, but there is little indication of any movement towards the PN. For example, in the second district, Labour lost 771 votes compared to 2009. But there is no indication that the PN benefited from this. In fact, in the third district – where the PL lost 633 votes over 2009 – the PN also lost 630 votes.

It is also probable that in these southern districts it was AD and Imperium Europa’s Norman Lowell who may have gained at the expense of both parties. For example, in the fifth district  – which includes Marsaxlokk and B’Bugia – AD increased its vote tally by 241 votes since 2009, which is nearly equivalent to the small increase registered by the PN (248).

This may indicate that the PN only made minor inroads despite the emphasis it gave to the power station issue. This could signify that for southern voters, the PN lacked the credibility to exploit discontentment on this issue. Moreover, blowing the issue out of proportion by comparing a gas tanker to atomic bombs may have backfired. Going overboard to prove a point has been one of the major shortcomings of the PN during the past year.

Cringing at the inevitable?

Moreover, building a parallel movement to compete with Muscat’s not only requires some out-of-the-box thinking, but a degree of trust in the leader of the movement.  For ultimately Labour’s movement hinges on Muscat’s popularity. Without Muscat there would simply be no glue to gel the components of this movement.

While one may rightly cringe at the Americanisation of Maltese politics and Muscat’s highly personalised way of conveying his message, by simply refusing to engage in a personality clash, Busuttil may be condemning his party to irrelevance. Moreover, the trust factor was already deployed to its advantage by the PN in the contest between Sant and Gonzi.

As things stand, winning back power in the traditional way by banking on a resurgent Nationalist Party seems very unlikely. On the other hand, in the absence of an economic collapse, it is equally difficult to defeat Muscat on his own turf, irrespective of whether Busuttil is replaced or not.

One long-term approach would be that of presenting a coalition, which goes beyond the PN’s traditional appeal and constituencies.  

But this would mean the PN having to resolve its identity crisis as a party which has lost the appeal of being Malta’s natural party of government.

For the first time since the 1970s, when the party discovered centre-left Christian democracy as an antidote to its elitist roots, the party has to rediscover itself again.