Leaving it in neutral - the enigma of Malta's foreign policy

Malta’s status as a neutral, non-aligned country seems to come up for public discussion every so often, only to promptly subside into oblivion.

In December 2009, a throwaway comment by US ambassador Douglas Kmiec – who casually asked whether Malta was also neutral to ‘peace’, following President Obama’s request for assistance in Afghanistan – prompted an avalanche of indignant responses.

Just over a year later, the US ambassador’s question appears to be still relevant.  What does Malta’s Constitutional neutrality actually mean in practice? And how can it be applied in the present scenario?

A tale of ‘two superpowers’

Much of the confusion surrounding the issue can be put down to a simple sleight of linguistics. As Stephen Calleya, professor of international relations at the University of Malta, said in 2009, the immediate question prompted by Malta’s neutrality clause is: ‘neutral to what?’

“As the Maltese Constitution clearly defines its neutrality from ‘the superpowers’, this relates to the scenario in 1979 when the world was split between two major political blocs,” Calleya told MaltaToday.

But while one of these two superpowers – the Soviet Union - has since spontaneously combusted, and other superpowers such as China are now a factor to be reckoned with, the wording of the Constitutional clause has survived.

This has long been cited to justify the use of Malta’s naval facilities by foreign military vessels for non-military purposes: much to chagrin of anti-war political groupings such as Moviment Graffitti, whose activists have grown hoarse protesting against the constant presence warships in the Grand Harbour.

And while approaching the same issue from a vastly different direction, observers such as Calleya concur that this wording ought to be revised. But any such revision will by definition force us to reconsider the full extent of the implications of neutrality.

“Issues of high security, humanitarian assistance, peace keeping missions and election observers, should all be issues to be taken into consideration and put into context of the modern days we are all living in,” Calleya suggested in 2009.

Is neutrality a Mirage?

On Monday 22 February, two Libyan Mirages (fighter jets) unexpectedly touched down on the Luqa runway: posing a unique and quite possibly unprecedented dilemma for the government of Malta.

The pilots had deserted, claiming to have been ordered to bomb civilians by the Libyan authorities. Malta was then placed in the awkward position of having to deny an official request for the return of ‘stolen’ Libyan government property.

In itself, the incident may have no direct bearing on neutrality. But the wider implications include the possibility (admittedly very remote) of some from of retaliatory action by Libya, on the basis that Malta had ‘taken sides’ in the conflict.

Even without the extreme eventuality of military aggression, the ongoing Libyan conflict poses a particular challenge to Malta’s neutrality for other reasons, too. Along with Italy, Libya happens to be one of the main guarantors of Malta’s neutrality: a fact which can only raises questions regarding the practical applicability (or even desirability) of retaining the same clause in its present form.

Theoretically, by guaranteeing Malta’s neutrality both countries have undertaken to protect Malta’s territorial integrity from military aggression. But with Libya’s ability (not to mention willingness) to honour this commitment now manifestly in doubt, one might justifiably question the legal validity of the guarantee… and with it, the legal value of the Constitutional clause as a whole.

Add to this the fact that international military forces (namely, Britain and the USA) are currently amassing in the central Mediterranean for a possible military intervention in libya – and more cogently, that Malta may already have been used as a platform to launch low-level military actions, as evidenced by the Dutch helicopter incident this week – and the overwhelming impression is that, when push comes to shove, our previously reliable neutrality clause suddenly appears ephemeral, to say the least.  

Moral matters

But long before delving into such matters, the concept of neutrality itself has often come under fire for entirely unrelated reasons. Generally, the criticism takes two distinct forms: neutrality is often described as ‘toothless’ and unworkable in practice; and sometimes, it is also deemed immoral.

In practical terms, neutrality did nothing to protect Belgium from German invasion and occupation in World War I. As for Europe’s best-known example of neutrality, the criticism is altogether more sinister in nature.

Switzerland’s reputation as a neutral state took a battering in the 1990s, when it was revealed that descendants of holocaust victims who had deposited their savings in Swiss banks before 1942 – when the country closed its borders to refugees - found they could not access the ‘dormants’ accounts, rumoured to be worth billions of dollars. It was revealed also that stolen Jewish property had been ‘laundered’ by Nazi officials through the Swiss banking system.

At this point, an altogether different picture of neutrality began to emerge. It came to be seen almost as a Satanic ‘pact’: whereby German non-aggression had been ‘bought’ in exchange for the money-laundering services of Swiss banks.

Separate criticism has also been levelled at neutral Sweden: this time for allowing the Nazis use of the Swedish railway infrastructure, in order to invade and occupy non-neutral Norway. And Malta can attest to the ‘neutrality’ of Spain in World War II: it was after all Spanish maritime authorities that informed Berlin when Operation Pedestal entered the Mediterranean through the Straits of Gibraltar in August 1942.

Even without these examples, it has long been argued that neutrality is little more than glorified fence-sitting. Kenneth Wain, Professor of Ethics of the University of Malta, is among those who regard neutrality as “plainly often wrong”.

“This is why I am against its presence as a general principle in the Constitution. Let me give you a practical example: I am looking out from my window and I see a man mugging an elderly woman in the street. I decide to do nothing, to stay neutral, in order not to create problems for myself, since I may put myself in danger if I intervene directly, or am called up as a witness. You would be right to regard my action as morally repugnant. Besides, my inaction doesn't really render me neutral. In actual fact it is helping and abetting the aggressor and contributing to the aggression against the innocent victim. For to be neutral is not to takeno position; it is to decide to do nothing, and that is taking a position which aids the aggressor.”

Transposing this example to the Libyan situation, Prof Wain adds that wherever clear acts of aggression are committed against innocent civilians, inaction is not a morally justifiably option.

“To do nothing is tantamount to presenting the aggressor with a blank cheque to continue his aggression. It cannot be a morally sustainable position.”