How Trump is playing Russian roulette with history

I am writing this blog on the sixth day of what may be the greatest US foreign policy gamble in decades, certainly the most consequential since the Bush era.

It is a gamble that seems to defy a number of historical lessons, namely: 1. That regime change does not occur through air strikes alone; 2. That military action, in itself, often unleashes forces that spiral out of control, as happened in Afghanistan and Iraq.

This time, the intervention has been carried out without even the pretence of international legality and in the absence of a clearly defined endgame.

I write amid reports of the first signs that Iraq-based Kurdish forces are joining the fray, an event reminiscent of the Northern Alliance’s role in Afghanistan. So far, the only certainty is that Iran will emerge from this conflict battered and weakened, irrespective of whether the regime survives. This would largely fulfil Israel’s objective of undisputed regional supremacy.

That leaves two broad alternatives: a swift regime meltdown leading to the replacement of the Islamic Republic with a new, possibly more secular and democratic order; or a descent into chaos, in which multiple actors — including remnants of the regime, ethnic groups, and rival opposition factions — vie for power, potentially exposing Iran to decades of foreign intervention.

From the perspective of international law, this war sets troubling precedents, normalising the notion that might is right and that conventions governing previous wars can simply be cast aside. I did not lose any sleep over Khamenei, but decapitating him — and any potential successor — smacks of hubris.

The Iranian response has so far followed a certain logic: that of dragging the entire region into chaos in the hope that mounting political pressure will force a ceasefire that leaves the regime intact. Yet decapitation has not, to date, triggered defections within the ruling elite, which remains united in the face of what it perceives as an existential threat. It also remains unclear what the US endgame is. If regime change is indeed the objective, what planning has been undertaken for that contingency? The impression conveyed by some Trump officials — including figures such as Pete Hegseth, is that they are out of their depth.

In this context, it is understandable that many in the Iranian opposition view this as a historic opportunity to topple a regime that has killed thousands during successive waves of protest, including those in January. There is some empirical grounding for this view: a 2024 survey by the Netherlands-based GAMAAN institute found that a significant majority of Iranians oppose the continuation of the Islamic Republic and favour fundamental political change.

At the same time, the regime retains a loyal base that cannot simply be erased or wished away. Many may have celebrated the assassination of the supreme leader but many also mourned him, not just in Iran but also in Iraq whose social fabric and national unity could be severely tested by the ongoing war. There is also a risk that the bombardment — which is already causing civilian casualties, including children reportedly killed in a school — could demoralise Iranians who detest the regime but fear a descent into chaos.

We lack reliable data on Iranian public opinion, and wars develop their own internal logic.

My impression is that sustained repression and a reckless foreign policy have increasingly decoupled Iranian nationalism from the Islamic Republic. Yet if the war drags on and Israel begins to replicate in Iran the script it followed in Gaza, public sentiment could shift.

Ultimately, my sense is that Trump — and, to a lesser extent, Netanyahu, whose objectives may be more narrowly defined and achievable — is playing Russian roulette with history.

The risk of a tragic repeat of the Iraq experience, which became a laboratory for breeding new monsters, still outweighs any conceivable positive outcome. US interventions in the Middle East, from the deposition of the Iranian nationalist Mossadegh in 1953 to the Iraq War, have rarely produced benign results.

Even if something positive were to emerge from this conflict, I would dread the sense of omnipotence it might instil in Trump.

That said, I still hope that, despite the questionable motives of the actors involved, an odious regime may finally fall, and that Iranians will at last have the opportunity to shape their own future. But short of this happening, the risks are gargantuan.