An autonomous Gozo: Not quite as island scores poorly on autonomy index

Gozo scores poorly on an international scoreboard that gauges the appetite for self-rule, according to a sociologist and small-islands scholar Godfrey Baldacchino.

In a comprehensive study on potential autonomy options for Gozo, Baldacchino adapted political scientist Eve Hepburn’s six-factor index that covers political distinctiveness, cultural identity, economic resources, representation, state accommodation and geographic isolation. Baldacchino gives Gozo just 18 out of 60 points. Here’s the breakdown:

1. Distinctiveness of political system: 1/10

A distinctive political system, usually with strong regional parties pushing for autonomy or independence, often signals an autonomy movement. But Gozo’s political scene is almost identical to Malta’s mainland. With the exception of the 1947 general election — when the Gozo Party and Jones Party briefly disrupted the duopoly — Gozitans have consistently voted for either the Labour Party or the Nationalist Party.

The Gozo Party was disbanded by 1950, and the Jones Party never elected anyone. Since then, no regionally based party has emerged to push for Gozitan interests. Gozo has also never had a secessionist or strong regional autonomy movement. Baldacchino notes this is both an advantage and a disadvantage – while it avoids political fragmentation, it also means the Maltese state feels no pressure to offer Gozo more autonomy to appease a regional political base. In contrast, Greenland developed local parties as early as 1964, several of which now support independence.

2. Strength of cultural identity: 5/10

Despite political conformity, Gozitans express a strong regional identity through language, customs and social perception. Many identify as Gozitan alongside Maltese, and this layered identity is reflected in dialects, traditions, and folklore. Proverbs stereotyping Gozitans as miserly (‘Għawdxi żokrati l-gremxul ħasbu kavati) or cunning (Għawdxi tajjeb aħarqu; aħseb u ara ħażin) reflect how their character is viewed separately from the Maltese mainstream. However, this identity does not usually challenge national unity – it complements it. As such, Gozo earns a moderate 5 out of 10 for cultural distinctiveness.

3. Economic resources: 4/10

Autonomy is more likely when a region has strong economic resources to sustain itself. Gozo, though gradually developing, remains economically reliant on tourism and public sector jobs. The island still depends on fiscal transfers from Malta and lacks a diverse economic base.

Its greatest economic asset is its aesthetic appeal – landscape, culture, and environment – which supports its tourism industry. Yet, this is not enough to trigger a movement for  economic independence, resulting in a score of 4 out of 10.

4. Political underrepresentation: 2/10

Underrepresentation at the national and international levels can spur autonomy claims. Gozo has 5 out of 65 parliamentary seats, a figure proportionate to its population. However, no Gozitan has ever held the office of Prime Minister since its establishment in 1921. Two Gozitans have been elected to the European Parliament, namely Josianne Cutajar and Thomas Bajada, and the regional president sits on the EU Committee of the Regions.

5. State accommodation of regional interests: 2/10

Gozo has a ministry for gozo and a regional council, but both have limited powers. Past efforts, such as the Gozo Civic Council, were short-lived. Although the state has repeatedly recognised Gozo’s distinctiveness, it has not devolved meaningful executive authority.

6. Geographic isolation and insularity: 4/10

Geographic isolation often strengthens claims for autonomy. Gozo is separated from Malta by just 4.5km of sea and is well-connected by subsidised ferries. Baldacchino argues that greater distance correlates with stronger calls for autonomy. Proposals for a fixed link (bridge or tunnel) between the two islands could, paradoxically, weaken the drive towards autonomy.

In fact, no island has achieved political autonomy after being physically connected to its mainland. Furthermore, clientelism often absorbs frustrations over Gozo’s double insularity, providing informal solutions rather than structural reforms.

Entrenched duopoly and red lines

One of the overarching obstacles to Gozitan autonomy lies in Malta’s entrenched two-party system. Since 1966, power has alternated between the Labour Party and the Nationalist Party. Gozo remains locked into this dynamic, with regional initiatives seen through a partisan lens.

Proposals to revive the Gozo Civic Council or introduce self-government are viewed suspiciously – as potential threats to the patronage systems on which both parties rely. Baldacchino argues that any decision on how to govern Gozo must consider how it would affect party power structures and electoral outcomes.

Two major barriers block real autonomy: Taxation and political confrontation. Baldacchino says no Maltese government is likely to devolve tax powers to a Gozitan authority. New, region-based taxes would be politically toxic and unpopular.

A second risk is the perception that a Gozitan power base could be used “to browbeat, badger, harass, disrupt and/or torpedo the central government in Valletta, for partisan political gain”.

Baldacchino also warns that greater self-rule could weaken the few checks and balances that currently exist, due to Malta’s oversight. However, other small islands like Nauru, Palau, and Tuvalu have gained independence despite having populations and land areas smaller than Gozo. San Marino, too, is both smaller and more autonomous – it is an independent state.

He suggests that comparisons with islands like Tobago — part of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, yet with its own legislature and executive — could offer lessons for Gozo. Similarly, the evolving arrangements between Copenhagen and the autonomous regions of Greenland and the Faroe Islands merit attention.