The slow death of democracy?

In the space of a week, the ongoing eurozone crisis has claimed the scalps of two democratically elected European governments: those of Italy and Greece, both replaced by unelected and largely technocratic administrations.

In both cases, this changeover was dictated by force majeure - namely, to avert the possibility of either those countries defaulting on their national debts - and the new governments were promptly legitimised by the countries' respective national parliaments.

Nonetheless, few would deny that this development raises serious doubts regarding the EU's democratic credentials. At a glance, it points towards a grey area where 'undemocratic' measures may be considered... if, for instance, the democratic norm fails to address certain key economic issues, or to take controversial decisions which, though painful, may be necessary for the economic survival of the country as a whole.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, many observers - mostly Eurosceptics - have termed the recent developments in Italy and Greece as a 'confirmation' of their traditional fears. Writing in the Telegraph, Christopher Booker (who had once come to Malta to campaign against EU accession) argued that the European Union has all along intended to eventually dismantle the democratic checks and balances of individual member States, so that power could be wrested from democratically elected governments, and transferred to a technocratic 'elite' consisting of (in this case) bankers and financial experts.

This may be an exaggeration, but at various levels the EU has indeed illustrated impatience, if not downright disdain, for the democratic process. Ireland, the Netherlands and to a lesser extent France all had a taste of this, when they were systematically made to hold repeated referendums on the Nice (and later Lisbon) Treaty, until the 'desired' result was duly achieved.

Strangely, few voices openly expressed doubts regarding the implications of such behaviour at the time. But with the recent dramatic events in Athens and Rome, an unmistakable note of scepticism has now firmly entered the general discourse regarding this institution we call the 'EU'.

As in all other things, the issue is not as straightforward as some would have us believe. There is after all another dimension to this same argument: and while equally uncomfortable, it nonetheless reminds us that democracy, too, serves an ultimate purpose... and when this purpose is no longer achievable, the retention of the status quo cannot realistically be considered an option.

After all, democratically elected governments do very often lack the courage to take unpopular decisions which they fear (justifiably) will cost them votes and ultimately elections. This was the dynamic that led Greece to bend financial rules to secure eurozone membership, and which caused Italy to avoid taking action to curb its national debt. It is a pattern that should ring alarm bells here in Malta, too. For our own democratically elected governments also have a long history of avoiding or postponing necessary decisions, in order to avoid unpleasant electoral consequences.

Admittedly, many of these decisions may appear inconsequential compared to the problems faced by Greece or Italy. But in the longer term there are also pressures which affect the sustainability of debt levels; and these may likewise boil down to concerns of a purely electoral (as opposed to economic) nature.

The implications are to say the least worrying. Taken to its logical conclusion, this argument suggests that democracy itself may one day be considered 'dispensable' - a line of reasoning that history has time and again proven to be fallacious; but which recent events suggest is being actively considered, at some level, by the European Commission.

The uncomfortable reality is that, when faced with the possibility of impending financial implosion, it is no longer practical to talk about democracy - at least in its present form - as the 'inviolable principle' many of us were brought up to believe in.

Clearly, a balance somehow needs to be struck between the most fundamental principles of democracy - i.e., the ultimate sovereignty of the electorate - and the necessities of financial survival in a globalised world. And already the need for this balance has been expressed in Malta.

When Prime Minister Lawrence Gonzi complained about the 'limited talent pool' of his elected MPs to US Ambassador Molly Bordonaro, it was clearly a reference to the fact that Maltese law currently prevents the appointment of unelected representatives (including technocrats) as ministers.

Even the Opposition, which loudly criticised Gonzi's remark, had made similar proposals in its day. Former Labour leader Alfred Sant had suggested elevating the MCESD chairman to the status of Cabinet minister: which would make of that position an unelected 'technocrat' minister.  

Both these approaches seem to tacitly acknowledge that a purely democratic set-up has limitations as well as advantages. Then again, there is a world of difference between merely recognising this reality, and suggesting (as the 'clean sweep' of Italian and Greek politics appears to suggest) that the democratic model in itself has altogether failed, and can therefore be unceremoniously jettisoned.

Before throwing the baby out with the bathwater, it would be well worth revisiting our most cherished notions of what democracy is all about. Drastic measures may well be necessary for the short-term goal of shoring up individual economies; but for the longer term, the possibility of democracy being somehow 'omitted' from our calculations - whether by necessity or design - is not one that can ever be lightly considered.