[ANALYSIS] In 2018, a Labour landslide or a PN rebound are outcomes still in play

Discerning voters face a hard choice in the next election: avoiding a dangerous Labour landslide or denying the PN the blank cheque of a premature re-entry to Castille. Will voters confirm or defy past electoral cycles in next year’s election?

Polls had registered a drop in trust in Muscat and a narrowing gap between the parties after Panamagate, but not enough to put Labour’s victory in 2018 in doubt
Polls had registered a drop in trust in Muscat and a narrowing gap between the parties after Panamagate, but not enough to put Labour’s victory in 2018 in doubt

The relatively good turnout for the PN’s protest march on Sunday suggests that an opposition which was written off as a potential contender for government in 2018, may well be showing signs of resurgence. Polls had registered a drop in trust in Muscat and a narrowing gap between the parties after Panamagate, but not enough to put Labour’s victory in 2018 in doubt.

Surely partcipation in demonstrations is mostly indicative of the party’s ability to mobilise its core vote and does not shed any light on its ability to win over floating voters, but in the battle of images last Sunday’s protest did send a message that Simon Busuttil can give Muscat a run for his money. Moreover getting people in the street has always been a harder task for the PN than for the PL, simply because of the sociological make up of its electoral block. But if the PN does stand a chance of winning next year, it will be subverting one of the unwritten laws of Maltese politics: that governments are only dethroned after two terms in power.

Post independence Maltese politics have operated through 10-year cycles of alternation which gave oppositions time to rejuvenate and re-invent themselves and governments to prove themselves in power: 1962 to 1971, 1971 to 1981 (prolonged by five years thanks to the perverse electoral result of 1981) and 1987 to 1996.  

Benefitting from incumbency, parties have also achieved their best results after their first term in government. This was the case with the PN in 1966, the PL in 1976 and the PN in 1992.

It was the extraordinary circumstances created by Dom Mintoff’s revolt which led to the premature demise of Alfred Sant’s government and broke with this cycle of alternation.  

This was followed by the existential EU membership debate, which further prolonged Labour’s time out in the political wilderness. Labour’s threat to EU membership and Sant’s decision to stay on as Labour leader despite the 2003 defeat, created an overwhelming imperative for a segment of voters to give the PN two more mandates beyond the administration’s expiry date. 

Last Sunday’s protest did send a message that Simon Busuttil can give Muscat a run for his money
Last Sunday’s protest did send a message that Simon Busuttil can give Muscat a run for his money

Labour’s historic rebound

The scale of Labour’s victory in 2013 may well be seen as being proportional to the extra years in power borrowed by the PN in power. Moreover Muscat in opposition did everything within his power to make sure that his would not be a normal but a super majority. This explains why he promised so much to so many and why he aimed at occupying the centre right end of the spectrum on economic policy while still appealing to social liberals alienated by the PN’s embedded moral conservatism. In government Labour has managed to appease most of the lobbies which backed it, while disappointing on themes like governance and environmental protection, two issues where the PN was also lacking.

In normal circumstances discerning voters would give Labour the benefit of the doubt, giving the PN five more years to renew itself on the opposition benches. For despite its efforts to produce sane albeit imperfect policies on the environment, the public domain and good governance, the PN has a mountain to climb to prove that it has the people with the conviction to enact such policies. Logic dictates that after being trashed in opposition by the largest margin in post independence history, a party needs a decade in opposition to re-emerge from the cleansing flames of purgatory and present itself as an alternative government. This is because voters vote for people not for abstractions. And the PN still lacks a front bench, which is seen as being both credible and effective. Moreover winning after only five years may give the PN the impression that 2013 was a fluke and they can keep on doing “business as usual,” as if by divine right, a prospect some voters will dread.

Yet this is not the full story. Panamagate has changed the political narrative, offering the PN a strong battle cry and the chance of an unexpected rebound. 

How Panama changed electoral dynamics

It was Muscat’s decision to retain Konrad Mizzi and Keith Schembri in their respective roles in the cabinet and Castille after both were exposed as the owners of companies in the secretive jurisdiction of Panama, which led to this impasse. Muscat’s decision suggested that he was unwilling or unable to remove the albatross from around his neck.

When politicians refrain from taking obvious steps, they inevitably become vulnerable to suspicion. Muscat’s admission on Sunday that his decision to remain silent in the face of accusations that he is the beneficiary of Egrant, the mysterious Panama company set up at the same time that two secret companies were set up for Konrad Mizzi and OPM chief of staff Keith Schembri, “may have been a mistake”, flies in the face that the only way to nip the scandal in the bud was by sacking Mizzi and Schembri and have the matter investigated by the police.

The problem for Muscat is that as the prudent Pana committee chairman Werner Langen observed (after being pressed for an answer by a One journalist to state whether there was corruption in this case) Mizzi’s and Schembri’s set-ups “look like money laundering”. Since it is probably impossible to prove otherwise, due to the failure of these politicians to open bank accounts in Dubai and other jurisdictions, it is this perception which is likely to linger on… simply because the two public officials did not resign in the first place.

Joseph Muscat’s decision suggested that he was unwilling or unable to remove the albatross from around his neck
Joseph Muscat’s decision suggested that he was unwilling or unable to remove the albatross from around his neck

Uncertainty among voters

For while public opinion polls so far suggest that Muscat has retained his popularity despite his decision to ignore the Panama outcry, it may also be the case that thousands of people are genuinely confused, caught between a rock and a hard place and are still undecided on what to do when election day comes.  

Surely there are also thousands (some of them former PN voters) who do not care a fig for good governance and are mostly interested in economic stability, growth and pro-business policies, as they probably were before 2013. For these – even a fraction of 2013 PN voters – Muscat’s Labour may well be an automatic choice.

Labour may well be hoping that this segment will compensate for any losses among switchers, thus giving Labour a similar result as that of 2013. Labour may well still be winning converts from the PN, especially among beneficiaries of permits and contracts.

But Panamagate cannot be seen in isolation. It has exposed a self-serving system of governance where anything goes, including what some voters perceive as blatant nepotism; as may be the case of the appointment of Sai Mizzi as Malta’s envoy to Shanghai. To top it all there is genuine concern on what a Labour government – which will be entrusted with major decisions like the new local plans – will do upon being elected again. In this sense a Labour landslide next year would be understood as absolution for Panamagate and a licence for unfettered governance.

It may well make Labour feel invincible. The discerning voter may well not be enthusiastic for a premature PN return to power but may dread more the prospect of an unfettered Labour government which feels omnipotent after winning a large majority despite Panama and the system of governance it has come to represent.

The Third party option

In such circumstances more will be tempted to vote for third parties. Some may well choose to protest by not voting or by voting Alternattiva Demokratika or Marlene Farrugia’s Partit Demokratiku. The far right patriots may also leave a mark by striking a populist chord among the less educated segment of floaters, who may see them as being the most anti establishment of the lot. But with the stakes being so high potential voters for these parties will also ponder on the question of which of the two big parties they want to see in the driving seat of the country.

Some may well choose to protest by not voting or by voting Alternattiva Demokratika or Marlene Farrugia’s Partit Demokratiku
Some may well choose to protest by not voting or by voting Alternattiva Demokratika or Marlene Farrugia’s Partit Demokratiku

This is because the choice of government in the Maltese electoral system is determined by the first preferences garnered by each party. In this sense talk of a pre-electoral alliance with the PN, an option currently being explored by Marlene Farrugia’s PD makes a degree of sense. For some voters a coalition based on a common programme may offer a sort of insurance against a relapse to the ‘business as usual’ PN style of governance. The problem is how to convince voters that third party participation in a PN list does not transform small parties into a disposable decoration put on a pre-baked cake made of unsavoury pre-2013 ingredients.  

Who will win the next election?

In view of its power of incumbency and its leader’s proven survival skills, Labour remains a firm favourite to win the next election. Yet its over-confidence may ultimately be its Achilles heel. The very fact that people are entertaining the sheer possibility of a change in government at this stage, exposes a fundamental weakness in Labour’s majority; it depends too much in the trust vested in its leader.

This may also explain why Muscat has been very economical in his defence of Evarist Bartolo and Chris Cardona from the accusations levelled against them. He may well hope that voters will put the blame on individual ministers while the king remains untainted. This may be the reason why the opposition is targeting Muscat directly by insinuating that he owns Egrant.

But ever since Muscat lost his sheen because of Panamagate, his party has become more vulnerable to accusations of impropriety. Even the most improbable accusations have gained credence simply because Panamagate was not nipped in the bud. Some are already feeling a sense of aversion at Labour’s continuous use of spin to deviate attention from its problems. The perception that Muscat is a cunning Machiavelli surrounded by a restricted self-serving elite, is seeping in among voters, to Labour’s detriment.  

The PN’s Achilles heel may well be the sense of urgency, which pushes it to appear more extreme and hard-line, in a way which leaves Muscat with the opportunity to present himself as a “moderate”. Let’s not forget that strongmen politicians like Silvio Berlusconi have always benefitted from a perception of appearing moderate in the face of continuous attacks, sometimes bordering on slander, thus giving them the opportunity to lash out at “fake news” even when this contains more than a grain of truth. Muscat knows this and will present himself as the leader of “moderates” against an insurgent opposition which constantly needs to up the stakes to galvanise its electorate.  

The Nationalist party’s symbiotic relationship with columnist and blogger Daphne Caruana Galizia – whose so far unproven but evocative revelations on Cardona’s presence in a German brothel led to the garnishee orders against which last Sunday’s protest was initially organised – symbolises the PN’s dilemma on how hard it is going to push to bring Muscat down. Parallel to this is the increased siege mentality among Labour supporters – symbolised by Cardona’s “axe” imagery, something which constantly exposes Muscat’s ‘moderate’ appeal as fake.

In this scenario where both parties are constantly raising the stakes, the prospect of another Labour landslide, which sees Muscat confirming or even increasing its vote of 2013, cannot be excluded. This would be the case if the electorate finds the prospect of quick return of the PN to power repulsive.

But the prospect of a landslide for Muscat may push other voters to give the PN a tactical vote simply to clip the wings of a future Labour government. These voters may well reason that with Labour going to win anyway, it is better to invest in a stronger opposition. In fact while a reduced Labour majority appears the logical outcome of the current impasse, some observers in both parties are convinced that the two most likely outcomes are a Labour landslide similar to that of 2013 or very close election which may go either way.

This makes the prospect of a slim PN majority a possibility. Polls so far suggest both possibilities: for while Muscat enjoys an 8 to 10 point lead on Busuttil, the PL leads the PN with just two to four points. Another major factor could be that a segment of genuinely undecided voters may be reluctant to state their voting intentions to pollsters. It is this silent category of voters – and not those who tend to attend national protests – who may ultimately determine who will the next election and probably these may be weighing the dangers of a premature Nationalist re-entry to the seat of power with the dangers posed by a landslide for Muscat.