[ANALYSIS] Blame games: Gonzi’s final act

On Sunday, Prime Minister Lawrence Gonzi clearly placed the onus of bringing down his government down on the rebel backbenchers insisting on his willingness to press ahead with the legislature and accusing any MP who decided otherwise of acting in an undemocratic manner "since the government was elected by the people for five years".

But the cost of pressing on against all odds is a daily pantomime, which confirms the perception that the PN is a divided party. 

Clearly, Gonzi risks a long hot summer where the daily news are dominated by backbench rants and accusations whose magnitude grows with every passing day, hitting right at the core of the party's nerve centres and sparing nobody.

Gonzi must have realised that he has lost control over his own destiny, as his future depends on how far any one of the rebels is willing to go. 

Reclaiming control

One way to pre-empt the moves of the 'gang of three' and take back control over the course of events would be to call a snap election now, something which is rather unthinkable as this would mean an electoral campaign during the summer.

Another option would be to call an election in September, possibly during the Independence festivities, and hold an election some time in autumn.

But the ultimate disadvantage of these two options is that Gonzi would have simply surrendered himself to events. Nor would he be in a position to blame any of the rebels for actually bringing the government down before even presenting its last Budget.

The only other option to reclaim control of events would be to reconvene parliament now and ask for a vote of confidence, putting the onus on the rebel backbenchers. 

Had he embarked on this risky path, Gonzi would have shown courage by calling the rebels' bluff once and for all: thus restoring a sense of certainty to the country, which is now rife with speculation that could also have an economic impact.

But although taking the crisis to parliament now is probably the most correct course of action, the PM is under no legal obligation to do so, as parliament has been adjourned to October. Contrary to popular perceptions, he does not have a legal obligation to call on the President so long as he does not lose a confidence vote in parliament, something which cannot happen when parliament is in recess.

This gives Gonzi a comfort zone from which he can call the shots against the rebels without undermining his government.

Moreover, apart from looking decisive,  the PM has little to gain politically by forcing matters now. For if he chooses to convene parliament, Gonzi would be simply exporting the crisis from the party - where he enjoys a clear majority - to parliament, where he commands a slender one-seat majority.

Rather than fight on his own terrain by forcing the rebels to bring down the government on vital national matters like the next budget, Gonzi would risk precipitating his downfall by expecting the rebels to register their confidence in his government.

Instead, Gonzi seems to have preferred to play a different game: that of surviving the summer, returning to parliament with a clear intention of passing pending laws like that on cohabitation and IVF, then proceeding  to present a budget, in the full knowledge that if any of the three rebels votes against it, the government will fall.

This would put the onus back on the backbenchers who would face a Hobson's choice between being held responsible for delaying the budget in harsh economic times and keeping Gonzi in power till the Christmas recess.

For Gonzi it would be easier to spin a vote against the budget as an anti-patriotic gesture than to spin a vote against him in a vote of confidence.

The only pitfall in this strategy is that the opposition could pre-empt the government by presenting a motion of no confidence as soon as parliament re-convenes: especially if it has a clear indication that one of the rebels would vote for the motion.

If such a motion passes, Gonzi would have no option but to go to the President and advise an election, which could take place in November or early December before the Christmas holidays.

For the Prime Minister, this option could be politically preferable to a self-imposed confidence vote, as it would highlight the perception that the rebels are in collusion with the opposition in their bid to stop the government from fulfilling its programme and completing its electoral mandate. 

Gonzi could also be banking on the sense of outrage, which could galvanise the PN's electorate. This sense of outrage could be greater if Gonzi is tripped on a motion moved by the opposition and backed by any one of the rebels than if Gonzi falls on a vote of his own making. Furthermore, even if the government falls in October, the government would still have gained valuable time.

This leaves the country two possibilities: either a November or early December election if the opposition brings the government down, a post-Christmas election if the budget is not approved, or an election some time next year if Gonzi manages to get the budget approved.