Councils’ report identifies major shortcoming in Delimara gas plant EIA

The Software model to analyze the remote but lethal possibility of a dispersion of a cold vapour cloud from the new gas fired power station is based on meteorological data from Catagena in Spain and not in weather conditions in Marsaxlokk.

The risk assessment was conducted to assess the possible impacts of a gas cloud dispersing in the atmosphere and travelling towards the coast.

 "The invalidity of the software model automatically invalidates the results of the whole risk analysis," a report commissioned by the Marsaxlokk and B'Bugia local councils which has been presented to the Malta Environment and Planning Authority claims.

The report was prepared by engineer Arthur Ciantar and architect Carmel Cacopardo in their roles as consultants to the two local councils.

The report notes that Cartagena, which is surrounded to the east and west by high hills, is very different from Marsaxlokk bay, which by comparison is larger and has high ground to the north, which is much lower than the hills to the east and west of Cartagena.

"The basic geography of both sites is so different that it is imperative to ask the question as to how could one approximate the conditions in Marsaxlokk bay utilising the conditions in Cartagena.

The risk assessment report states that LNG vaporises rapidly when exposed to ambient heat sources such as water.  In the rare eventuality of a major incident the LNG will initially produce a cold vapour that is denser than air and will stay close to the surface or the grounds. As this cloud mixes with air, it will warm up and disperse.

According to the council report "this essentially mean that unless the gas cloud ignites than the possibility exists that a gas cloud could traverse significant downward distances surely reaching not only residences around the station but also Marsaxlokk and Birzebbuga."

The report acknowledges that the probability of such an accident is remote. But "ascribing a probability of say 1 in a 10,000 years to an event does not exclude that the event will not occur tomorrow, within a week, a month or a couple of years."

Rather than speaking of the probability of the occurrence of an event, the two councils expect MEPA to concentrate on the worst-case scenario. The fundamental question should be "how many people will be expected to die" in the event of the worst accident possible.

The EIA had revealed that 91% of the population of Marsaxlokk want the LPG tanker to be located outside the Port of Marsaxlokk.

While recognising that a plant operating on LPG is cleaner than the present HFO plant, the councils insists that the location of the LPG tanker within the port should only be a temporary measure and only if a proper risk assessment is conducted, and preparations should be made to relocated the storage vessel outside the harbour "thus eliminating all risks both to the Delimara power station and more importantly to the populations of both localities."