[ANALYSIS] Love in the time of fatigue

After the most divisive campaign in post-1987 Maltese political history, the country seems to be heading to a cooling-off period of sorts. Two consecutive cordial meetings between new PN leader Simon Busuttil and Prime Minister Joseph Muscat, which are set to be followed by bimonthly summits between the two leaders, seem to indicate a change in the rules of political engagement and a restoration of dignified political etiquette.

Both political leaders now agree on the need for a less antagonistic approach by their respective political-party media. Still, such an arrangement seems to be more dictated by convenience than conviction. For instead of taking the bull by the horns - dismantling the two political TV stations and ensuring independent public broadcasting which enjoys the good will of all - the two leaders conveniently talk about toning down their own media in a moment when both need some introspection.

Taking stock of divisions sown

Looking back, both parties share some blame for the divisive climate, although Gonzi's decision to go on an unusually long election campaign after a year of internal turmoil in his party, which lost him his parliamentary majority months before the election, was the crucial factor.

Had Gonzi gone for an election back in February 2012, after failing to secure a viable majority in the house, Busuttil would probably have still won the succession after a landslide defeat, but he would have done so without inheriting the legacy of a bitter campaign.

In their bid to recover support, PN strategists felt that they had to play the divisive card, a tactic which grossly backfired and played into the hands of Labour's post-ideological message of national unity.

Ironically the least responsible for this state of affairs was the PN's official media, namely in-Nazzjon and Net TV, which were largely ineffectual and limited to preaching to the converted. The more divisive message was carried at turns by the party's billboard campaign or Nationalist-leaning pundits on other media platforms, with whom the party became guilty by association.

For its part, Labour contributed to raising the temperature by starting a taunting billboard campaign as early as December 2011, as soon as Franco Debono started to question the government's one-seat majority. This set in motion the longest and probably most expensive election campaign in Maltese history, which ultimately put Labour in government with an unprecedented nine-seat majority.

Widespread electoral fatigue after such a long campaign makes a truce desirable for the wider electorate. A period of political silence will surely suit the interests of the conqueror, but it may also give breathing space to the vanquished.

A too-long honeymoon

After spending 24 of the past 26 years in opposition, Labour is still finding its way through the corridors of government. Although Muscat has so far excelled in the art of campaigning in poetry, he now has to prove he can govern in prose. He still must take fundamental decisions on the economic front.

Surely Muscat may be more grateful for the economic inheritance left by the Nationalist government than he was ever prepared to admit in opposition. Not only is unemployment low, but the Maltese economy is buoyant, as certified by credit-rating agencies and the IMF.

But Muscat also finds his fiscal wings clipped by a budget which reduces government revenue substantially through tax cuts for higher income earners. With the European Commission predicting the deficit to widen to 3.7%, the government is desperate for an injection of economic growth to make up for the expected shortfall in revenue.

In the absence of growth, the government will not be in a position to honour the previous government's commitment, which it was in a hurry to endorse before the election, to slash the top rate of income tax to 25% by 2015.

So it is in Muscat's interest not to rile political passions at a time when he needs to dedicate his full energies to realising projects like the new gas plant and the land reclamation aimed at boosting the construction sector. The latter may offer short-term respite at the risk of increasing the country's dependence on real estate. In fact, one would expect a series of announcements related to these controversial projects during the summer lull, when people are in holiday mode.

Ultimately, Muscat's promise to improve living standards for the less-well-off, who still constitute the bulk of Labour's support, will depend exclusively on trickle-down wealth, the result of increasing the size of the cake.

Muscat's hegemony depends on his ability to keep contrasting interests on board. The only way he can do this is by replicating Eddie Fenech Adami's economic success in 1987 - but given the added imperative not to increase the deficit and expose the country to excessive deficit procedures from the European Commission.

On a purely ideological level, Muscat can bank on a number of initiatives on the civil-liberties front (like the introduction of civil unions) which could keep liberals satisfied. But such initiatives could also generate further demands, which he may be unable to answer. Moreover, the liberal segment is also alienated by Labour's pandering to the redneck vote through concessions on hunting. Fortunately for both main parties, Alternattiva Demokratika's leadership quandary means that they face little competition on that front.

Another choice Muscat has to make is whether to continue attacking his predecessors by constantly exposing scandals involving former ministers or simply move on with the task of governing, turning a blind eye of past misdeeds.

Muscat is conscious that, as prime minister, he can no longer speak as opposition leader and that people yearn more for results in their daily lives than for Nationalist blood.

To be in a position to deliver, he may well bank on a more relaxed political climate, and the price for this could be absolving some of the sins of his predecessors yet paving the way for Labour to profit from the power of incumbency.

In his first two months in government, Muscat has walked a fine line between appeasing loyalists through several tribal appointments, which stood in sharp contrast with the Malta taghna lkoll pledge, and conciliatory moves aimed at cooling tempers and not rocking the boat.

He could also be banking on his current venial sins being easily forgivable, using the same yardstick that is the PN's unofficial code of ethics.

Simon's dilemma

While for Muscat a temporary truce with the opposition is a win-win situation, for the PN it is a double-edged sword.

Deprived of its control of public broadcasting, the PN, unlike Labour, now depends more than ever on its own media. In this sense, the idea of toning it down looks like a one-sided affair, with Labour sowing the seeds of its hegemony while reaping the benefits of a more compliant opposition.

But such a reading ignores one important factor: the inherent weakness of the PN's media in reaching out beyond hardcore PN constituents. It also ignores the national mood, which is more conducive to a period of calm after the storm, something which puts Labour at an advantage but makes it difficult for the PN to pounce.

The PN faces another major difficulty. Attacking any betrayal of the Malta taghna lkoll pledge exposes it to criticism that the pot is once again calling the kettle black.  The PN also carries a toxic baggage on issues like BWSC, and this makes even legitimate criticism of the present government's energy policies difficult for the electorate to digest.

Simon Busuttil may also need a cooling-off period until he settles in as leader. While that may not be entirely in his party's interests, it would clearly serve his.

Unlike Muscat in 2008, Busuttil cannot bank on the enthusiasm generated by the novelty of his leadership election, simply because he is still licking his wounds from a defeat in which he played a major role.

Had de Marco won the leadership election, he would have been in a better position to take on Labour in a more aggressive way, counting on his detachment from the PN's divisive electoral campaign.

Busuttil is compromised by his own pre-electoral posture, which damaged his previous appeal to middle-of-the-road voters. Busuttil must now be keen on reclaiming this middle ground, and he may be sensing that the first and best way to do so is by winning back the goodwill of the switchers, rather than turning them off by scoffing at any goodwill coming his way from Muscat.

Yet Busuttil must be careful of Muscat's soft embrace, for it could herald a brand new world wherein political confrontation is labelled divisive and seen as an affront to a totalising national consensus.  This could be the reason why Busuttil is so  keen on keeping the distinction between opposition and government, insisting that any appointments of opposition members on government boards must be regulated by a specific law.  On the other hand, Muscat has been keen on making sops to the opposition by appointing a number of former Nationalist MPs on some boards, in what can be seen as  yet another attempt to exploit the disgruntlement on the other side.

In reality, Busuttil needs time to build around him a team which will prove that he represents a radical change from the Gonzi years. Not only does he have to exorcise memories of his wicc ta' nazzjonalist gaffe by sounding more conciliatory, but he has to rebuild a party which was left in a state of neglect by his predecessor, who clearly was more at ease in his role as prime minister than that of party leader.

While some Nationalists expect the PN to suddenly transform itself into the same formidable opposition which was able to outwit both Mintoff and Alfred Sant, such a reading would seem to discount the scale of the defeat in March and also today's changed circumstances.

Unlike Fenech Adami in 1996, who despite being defeated could feel glee about the internal contradictions of a one-seat majority, which included the unpredictable Mintoff, Busuttil knows that there are no shortcuts to get his party back in power. He faces a long road ahead, the success of which depends on the decisions he takes in the next few months.

Neither is the party animated by strong rallying cries, as was democracy in the 1980s and Europe in the late 1990s and early noughties. Busuttil's first priority must be to rebrand his party.

Therefore it is logical to expect a quiet summer, during which Busuttil weighs his anchors in the party and prepares for a slow and painful recovery, which cannot depend exclusively on Labour's misfortunes in power but also in the PN's ability to read the signs of the times.

But the truce may not last beyond the autumn season.

The coming storm

By then Labour will have had to face its first real budget and take concrete decisions to avoid a spiralling of the country's deficit. Autumn may well represent the definitive end of Labour's honeymoon, which has allowed Muscat to govern by prose. From then onwards, he will face the difficult task of leading the country without losing his hold on his party.

Moreover, by that time, Busuttil will have faced his first do-or-die task, that of avoiding humiliation in the forthcoming MEP elections. Busuttil has already set his sights at winning three seats of the six available, fully knowing that one can still win a third seat (even if Labour wins the elections by a small margin). But in the absence of a massive wave of disillusion among Labour voters, which could result in widespread abstention, Busuttil will have to win back a number of the switchers who crossed the floor in the last general election. While being too aggressive may simply turn them off, Busuttil will have to take risks and capitalise on any sign of discontentment, possibly targeting other categories of Labour voters (not the switchers exclusively) by repositioning the party at the centre-left. This would not be incomprehensible for someone who used to define himself privately as a social democrat.

While it seems inevitable that the parties will be back at each other's throats in a few months' time, the chemistry between Muscat and Busuttil, who share similar political backgrounds and political traits, does augur a less divisive arena in the coming years. The risk is that a convergence of interests and convenience may also be the unwelcome consequence of a restoration of political etiquette. It is interesting to consider whether such meetings will spur real political reforms, relaxing the hold of political parties on civil society on a more long-term basis.