ANALYSIS | Five challenges Borg must clear to save PN
Alex Borg’s victory presents the temptation of a carte blanche to reshape the PN — but the slim margin leaves him exposed to overreach. He now has five major challenges: managing Delia, driving generational change, maintaining party unity, dispelling the perception of being too close to developers and closing the gap with Labour. James Debono asks whether he can navigate them without further fracturing an ailing party
1. Victory gives Borg the allure of a carte blanche to reshape the PN in his image, but the narrow margin makes overreach a real risk. His first hurdle is balancing this temptation with the need to keep the party’s pieces together.
The PN has been in opposition since 2013, losing three consecutive general elections by a 35,000 to 40,000 vote margin. This has left the party demotivated, divided, and financially crippled.
Big business, which traditionally funds party machines, and political careerists who provide technocratic and managerial appeal, have shunned the party with no realistic hope of winning. So have talented, civic-minded thinkers who are turned off by the party’s toxic environment.
As happened with Labour, things only changed when the party seemed poised for victory. At that point, people — even PN pundits — jumped on the new gravy train. Some did so out of genuine conviction, believing change was needed. Others were simply rent-seekers. The rest is history.
Under Joseph Muscat, Labour reinvented itself as a big-tent party spanning the ideological spectrum, held together by strong leadership and the promise of imminent change. The PN under Borg may attempt something similar, granting its new leader a carte blanche to win at all costs in a survey-driven approach to politics.
The conservative wind blowing across Europe could make Borg’s task easier to mould the party in his image. He may even emulate Muscat’s movement of moderates and progressives with one of moderates and conservatives. But this process is complicated.
The PN’s best hope is to narrow the gap in the next election and aim for victory in the one after. Yet few people vote to minimise losses; most vote for a government in waiting. This explains Borg’s insistence that he can really win the next election. He needs to sell an illusion — one that voters (and donors) may find hard to buy if surveys continue showing a substantial Labour lead.
The result of the leadership election further complicates matters: Borg cannot ignore Delia and his loyalists, who may demand a share of influence. Nor can he ignore those who backed Delia as a stopgap to block the candidate they least wanted. These may well prove to be the most elusive category.
Meanwhile, some voters will closely monitor Borg’s stance on collusion with powerful financial interests, particularly on land use — all in a context where, despite growing liveability problems, Labour’s economic model is still delivering enough revenue to sustain social expenditure and subsidies.
2. The chemistry with Delia will inevitably shape Borg’s term at least until the next election. Navigating the former leader’s popularity while asserting his own authority and projecting unity within the party is his most immediate challenge.
Delia may bow out gracefully, consoled by losing by only 44 votes — a near vindication for someone dethroned yet almost returned as leader. By stepping aside and allowing Borg to grow without overshadowing him, Delia could come across as a gentleman.
Alternatively, Delia may seek a leadership role in the style of Guido de Marco. This presents Borg with a dilemma. By offering Delia the deputy leader’s post and blocking others from contesting it, Borg would appear magnanimous in victory, tap into the energy of both campaigns, and project a message of unity that reflects the split result. Borg may even opt to keep the status quo, keeping Alex Perici Calascione in office while offering Delia a prominent portfolio in the shadow cabinet.
Much depends on the level of trust and chemistry between the two. Borg may also need another formula to broaden the party’s appeal. Having two male lawyers at the helm may not seem representative, although Borg’s pledge to appoint two additional deputies could help.
What is certain is that the result gives Delia enormous leverage. A single word from him casting doubt on the outcome could sink Borg’s chances of a decent showing in the next election.
The Delia campaign’s letter questioning the eligibility of some voters was likely a reminder not to side-line him. And although Delia quickly clarified that he would not contest the result, the letter sent shivers down party activists’ spines.
For Borg, handling Delia is a double-edged sword: the charismatic former leader, trusted by half of party members, remains a formidable force.
3. Borg’s third challenge is driving a generational change as way of enhancing the ideological diversity of the PN as a big-tent party — one capable of generating bold ideas without alienating key factions and experienced MPs.
During the campaign, Borg emphasised his commitment to generational change. The party is not short of talent, and it has MPs who could make capable ministers. Crucially, they are not all lawyers and come from varied professional backgrounds, potentially making the PN more representative.
However, the leadership campaign itself was not fully representative, with more liberal and centrist figures like Darren Carabott and Mark Anthony Sammut opting out. But Borg also needs to balance this with experience, including that of veteran MPs like Mario De Marco and Carmelo Mifsud Bonnici.
Borg’s confirmation of George Vital Zammit’s role in drafting the electoral manifesto may indicate that Borg will not impose his conservative instincts on a party which is greater than its leader.
While the PN has elected a leader who preferred Trump to Biden and admires Giorgia Meloni, its manifesto is being drafted by a respected academic with centre-left leanings. Instead of imposing his will, Borg may invest in the party’s diversity, bringing organisational discipline without tilting too much to the right.
He may even rely on the ‘free vote’ formula for sensitive issues such as assisted dying — personally appealing to conservatives through his own stance while still leaving space for liberals to feel at home in the same party. But voters may be left confused by such an approach.
4. As Opposition leader Borg is bound to talk with all stake holders including developers, but he needs to dispel the image that he is in their pocket.
Still, complications will arise, especially when Borg faces demands from powerful lobbies like the construction industry, or when shady operators start circling the party if they sense vitality. After all it was the same story in Muscat’s party since its early days.
Yet internal stability could also attract talented and civic-minded professionals who previously shunned the PN as toxic. Cultivating this latter group is key to the party’s future success.
Yet this category may be easily turned off by any signs of compromise with donors or their proxies, who may seek to influence the party with their money. Borg is particularly susceptible to this criticism mainly because of his stance on Chambray.
It is now up to Borg to dispel the perception of being too close to developers. The debate of the proposed planning bills offers Borg an opportunity to stand up to be counted and win respect among public spirited environmentalists.
5. Borg’s fifth hurdle is reducing the PN’s deficit in the next election, even if he publicly aims to win it outright. Only by doing so can he earn the leeway to reshape the party. Until then, his moves are constrained by the need to maintain credibility and party cohesion.
Alex Borg may choose not to rush. He may keep insisting on victory in the next election, knowing this will likely only help narrow the gap — an essential first step towards becoming prime minister sometime in 2030 or 2031.
To do so, Borg must secure party unity and gradually establish his leadership without losing any more pieces. He knows that if the PN loses again by the same margin, his leadership would be in peril, much like Grech’s position after holding on despite a crushing defeat in 2022. But if Borg manages to substantially narrow the gap, he could realistically become prime minister at the age of 37.
This gives him time to co-opt a new generation. Yet the paradox is that Borg, at just 30 years old, must already project himself as a prime minister-in-waiting — not in five years’ time when his project might be more mature.
In this sense, Borg faces a catch-22: rushing change could alienate many, undermining the internal stability he needs for a serene campaign. But without radical change, his party risks another heavy defeat.
But to even give Labour a run for its money, Borg needs to navigate between continuity and change- with his own voters differing on which part of Labour’s legacy is worth preserving-while also proving himself as an adult in the room.
The question now is sharper than ever: does he have what it takes, or was contesting in the first place a pretentious gamble?
