Malta’s neutrality tested: Five lessons from Ukraine

The human cost of Vladimir Putin’s full‑scale invasion of Ukraine has been immense. Independent research estimates that nearly two million military personnel on both sides have been killed, wounded, or gone missing since February 2022.

Civilian suffering has been severe as well: United Nations monitors have verified nearly 15,000 Ukrainian civilian deaths and over 40, 000 civilian injuries since the full‑scale invasion, though the true toll is likely higher.

Ukrainians are still subjected to daily attacks on their civilian infrastructure, including energy facilities. Over eight million Ukrainians have fled abroad and millions more are internally displaced, turning the conflict into one of the largest humanitarian crises in Europe since World War II. These include approximately 2,460 people fleeing Ukraine who have been granted temporary protection status in Malta.

Yet despite growing weariness, Ukraine’s sacrifice has not been in vain.

Russia’s early strategy, aimed at a swift overthrow of the Ukrainian government, was thwarted by Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s resilient leadership and the determination of Ukrainian forces and society, which have maintained Kyiv’s sovereignty and frustrated Moscow’s expectations of rapid capitulation.

Yet, four years on, both sides are bogged down in a war of attrition as US pressure has shifted from full support for Ukraine to increased pressure on Kyiv to cede territory, amidst concern in European capitals that this will only serve to whet Putin’s appetite for destabilizing the EU’s eastern frontier.

Russia still occupies roughly 19 % of internationally recognised Ukrainian territory, with largely stagnant frontlines despite counter‑offensives.

Beyond the immediate tragedy, the war has reshaped European security thinking, exposed the fragility of peace on the continent, and highlighted contradictions in global politics—from fractured alliances to transactional diplomacy. For Malta, the conflict raises a deeper question: how can constitutional neutrality coexist with EU membership, amid an increasingly militarised security landscape? Five key lessons emerge from this crucible.

1. Neutrality does not mean sitting on the fence — neither does it rule out strong moral positions

Malta’s constitutional neutrality bars it from joining military alliances or hosting foreign bases. Yet, from the first day of the invasion, it condemned Russia’s aggression in the EU and United Nations forums and backed successive EU sanctions packages targeting Moscow’s economy, banking, energy, and military supply lines.

Malta also voted in favour of EU Council conclusions reaffirming support for Ukraine, including assistance that has encompassed political, financial (including aid that enables Ukraine to fund armaments indirectly), and non‑lethal support — a principled stance consistent with neutrality as an active principle of universal values entrenched in international law.

However, the political narrative has at times been muddled. In March 2025, following the widely reported rebuke of Volodymyr Zelenskyy by Donald Trump during an Oval Office confrontation, Prime Minister Robert Abela showed signs of dithering, questioning whether Ukraine could win the war and framing peace as requiring compromise. “Weapons won’t stop the war,” he said, adding that traditional military investment risks escalating conflict rather than ending it. 

These statements — while grounded in Malta’s long‑standing focus on peace and diplomacy evaded two key realities: Ukraine would have lost the war had it not been assisted by the EU and the US and Russia remains unwilling to withdraw from territories it illegally usurped during the war.

Nonetheless, Malta’s formal voting record remained firmly aligned with the EU’s collective response, and the country subsequently reaffirmed its stance in favour of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. While Malta has consistently protected its national interests, particularly regarding the risks posed by diverting Russian assets to help Ukraine, it has never acted like a pariah, as Viktor Orbán’s Hungary continues to do.

Prime Minister Robert Abela meeting Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky in 2023

2. Consistency in applying principles is essential — and perceptions of double standards matter

A core strength of neutrality is its claim to an independent moral yardstick applicable to different scenarios irrespective of the actors involved. In fact, credibility hinges on consistent application of the same moral yardstick amid criticism that the West has applied different yardsticks to Ukraine and Gaza. In this sense, Malta’s role as a bridge builder between the EU and the Global South, where the dissonance is most felt, can be enhanced by being proactive on both issues.

In this respect, despite being neutral, Malta has lagged behind peers who were more proactive on other conflicts. Some EU member states, both neutral (Ireland) and NATO members (Spain), moved early to recognise the State of Palestine, whereas Malta waited for the lead of larger powers such as the United Kingdom and France.

Moreover, Spain and Ireland have also withdrawn from the Eurovision Song Contest, which has rightly banned Russian entries but permitted Israeli participation despite the loss of more than 70,000 lives in Gaza. Malta’s reluctance to do the same speaks volumes on its willingness to walk its talk on respect for international law. 

In contrast European Commissioner for Sport Glenn Micallef has admirably said he will boycott the opening ceremony of the 2026 Winter Paralympics in Milan‑Cortina in protest at the decision to allow Russian and Belarusian athletes to compete under their national flags, arguing that he cannot support reinstating national symbols while Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continues. 

3. The EU is becoming a political–military alliance, and Malta must define its place within it

Malta entered the EU in 2004 alongside fellow neutral members like Austria, Sweden, and Finland. Since the invasion, Sweden and Finland have joined NATO, narrowing the bloc of non‑aligned EU states.

This may well have been one of Russia’s failures: what was presented as a war triggered by Ukraine’s NATO ambitions ended up effectively doubling the total length of Russia’s frontline with NATO allies.

At the same time, EU institutions have moved toward integrated defence planning, with initiatives such as the €800 billion ReArm Europe defence investment framework and legal adjustments to allow coordinated defence spending — measures Malta ultimately supported in Council votes, even if its contribution remains non‑combatant and voluntary. To some extent, Malta’s position would be more tenable if the EU itself builds its own security infrastructure, even if this raises questions on its own, especially if defence spending starts cutting into budgets and precludes investment in addressing the social discontent that fuels the rise of the Putin- and Trump‑friendly far right. 

While Malta’s constitutional neutrality limits direct military engagement, its votes and participation in shaping EU security policy underscore that neutrality need not equate to marginalisation.

4. Neutrality does not shield Malta from vulnerability — and conflict spill overs test that reality

Being classed as “unfriendly” by Russia after sanctions, illustrates that small states cannot escape geopolitical consequences. Moreover, a recent drone incident linked to Israel involving a flotilla near Maltese waters underscored that even non‑belligerent states can be drawn into the fold of external conflicts.

Neutrality does not magically insulate — it merely situates response capacity within legal and diplomatic frameworks. As threats evolve to include cyber and hybrid tactics, Malta’s security calculus must balance constitutional principles with pragmatic cooperation, much of which flows through EU mechanisms.

Furthermore, developments in eastern Europe have raised strategic anxieties beyond Ukraine’s borders: fears in the Baltics and in Republic of Moldova about potential future exploitation of Russian‑speaking minorities reflect a security landscape where territorial encroachment, once unthinkable, is again plausible.

As EU members, we cannot escape our obligations towards fellow members. Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) does include a “mutual defence clause,” which states that if an EU member is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, other members have an obligation to aid and assist “by all the means in their power.” But so far, the ability to respond has been tied to NATO commitments. It could well be in Malta’s interest if this obligation is grounded in a European framework independent of NATO, especially in a scenario where the US itself is threatening the sovereignty of EU members like Denmark over Greenland.

Prime Minister Robert Abela offered Malta as a platform for peace for world’s warring parties when addressing the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2025

5. Trump’s aggressive posturing on Greenland has raised questions on NATO’s endurance, raising the security profile of the EU — and Malta’s security calculus must adapt

When Trump openly suggested seizing Greenland from Denmark and expressed impatience with NATO commitments, questions arose about the reliability of traditional guarantees. Moreover, Trump’s invocation of the Monroe Doctrine to justify interventions in the Americas could well embolden other powers, including Russia, Turkey, India and China, to make similar claims in their own backyards.

Some European leaders still seek to flatter Washington — Mark Rutte, now head of NATO and formerly Dutch prime minister, quipped about calling Trump “big daddy”—but there is growing recognition that Europe must build strategic autonomy.

Concomitantly, voices like Friedrich Merz and Emmanuel Macron have argued for stronger European defence capabilities independent of the transatlantic anchor.

For Malta, this evolving reality means that the EU may increasingly be the framework in which its security is embedded. Neutrality, in this context, becomes less a withdrawal from politics. This is because we are still sitting on the table along other EU members where decisions on foreign policy and security are taken. The fact that Malta has not obstructed EU plans, without directly participating in any military build‑up, has so far worked well. How long this arrangement will last, depends on Malta carving its own niche alongside other neutral EU members like Ireland.    

Ultimately, the war in Ukraine has not rendered Malta’s neutrality superfluous. But it has reshaped its operational context. Reframing it within an emerging multipolar reality, in which the European Union must assert itself and make its voice count, is now inevitable.