[ANALYSIS] Local councils: The mid-term exam

How have the two leaders fared so far in the campaign for local elections that Joseph Muscat first wanted to avoid but then proceeded to fight tooth and nail to win, JAMES DEBONO asks?

Since Busuttil has not set any targets, probably to insulate himself against defeat, it will be left to others to set his benchmarks.
Since Busuttil has not set any targets, probably to insulate himself against defeat, it will be left to others to set his benchmarks.
Muscat is banking on a high turnout of PL voters and a low turnout for the PN to retain the party’s 55% majority.
Muscat is banking on a high turnout of PL voters and a low turnout for the PN to retain the party’s 55% majority.

Simon Busuttil: Making it local

While Busuttil has shown his worth as an organiser – especially in motivating party activists – recruiting new candidates (half of whom are new), and targeting swing localities like St Paul’s Bay, he still lacks the sparkle to inspire and challenge Muscat on a national level.

That is why Labour TV spots are emphasising the national dimension while the PN is emphasising the local dimension by harping on the performance of PN-led councils, compared to that of councils which have a PL majority.

Still the national backdrop to the campaign started with the PN on a high note in the wake of the Auditor General’s damning reports on the Café Premier bailout and the hedging agreement with SOCAR, but then saw Busuttil go on the defensive over revelations about former minister Giovanna Debono.  

But in the past weeks Busuttil has managed to put accountability, meritocracy and transparency at the centre of the political debate, exposing Muscat’s greatest weakness – that of failing to deliver on his “taghna lkoll” pledge.  

However, by putting honesty at the centre of the political debate, Busuttil exposed himself to Labour’s ability to undermine him by diverting attention to pre-2013 scandals.

Too nervous to score?

The Times talk debate has been definitely Busuttil’s lowest point in the campaign.  

While Muscat was condescending and at times arrogant in belittling his adversary, Busuttil showed signs of nervousness and unease, which annulled any gains he could have made by hitting out at Muscat’s own growing list of “scandals”. 

Moreover while his criticism of Muscat’s track record on governance issues was legitimate, he crossed the line by accusing the PM of having been bribed, without backing up his claim. 

It is doubtful whether Busuttil can ever match Muscat’s charisma and trust-rating, which is now boosted by the latter’s power of incumbency and his power to dispense patronage and reward converts from the other side. 

But Busuttil can do much better in charming the electorate. Instead of using his television appearances to portray a positive contrast between his more subdued and sober character in the face of Muscat’s overbearing caudillo image, Busuttil is coming across as stiff, touchy, nervous and aggressive; all of which are characteristics which make people trust him less, not more.  

This may explain why despite signs that Muscat is losing points, with the latest MaltaToday survey showing his lowest approval rating since the election, Busuttil is still 15 points behind Muscat in the trust barometer.  

The inability to gain ground despite the government’s shortcomings may be increasing Busuttil’s frustration and he is showing it.

This is evident in his unease when faced by media questions and reluctance in engaging in exchanges with reporters.  In a number of cases he even avoided these exchanges, instead of using wit to thwart the assault of the Labour media, and turning a liability into an asset.

Honesty is a double-edged sword

Moreover after being hawkish with regard to the government’s shortcomings in governance he has been on the defensive over the Giovanna Debono case. One may argue that Busuttil had little space for manoeuvre a few weeks before elections in various Gozitan localities.   

Any action against Debono before local elections may well have penalised the party in Gozitan localities where local elections are taking place and where Debono is still popular. 

Surely he may well have killed the issue by suspending the former Minister but in so doing he would have set a precedent for any former minister faced with similar accusations. So far Busuttil has consistently said that he would only suspend PN activists in two cases: when they admit their wrongdoing, as was the case with former PN ministers Michael Falzon and Ninu Zammit, or when they are formally charged by the police. So far Busuttil has not been faced by the latter scenario, which rather puts him at the mercy of the police commissioner.  

Ultimately Busuttil may feel frustrated that his ambitions are thwarted by revelations on past matters over which he had no control but he desperately needs to formulate a strategy to counter the fallout from such cases. 

The scale of a defeat foretold

Busuttil has set himself very modest and vague goals; that of improving the party’s performance in some localities lost in the 2012 round. In fact Busuttil has refrained from setting a benchmark on which he can be questioned after the election.

Busuttil clearly starts the election as the underdog and his expectations are low. This is why the party has downplayed the importance of local elections, which ironically are only taking place thanks to the opposition’s principled stance against their being put off to 2019.

The party has also shown signs of vitality by presenting a number of new candidates in various localities. Definitely Busuttil and party general secretary Chris Said must be credited for rebuilding a party machine which had ceased to function.

The party seems to have been more focused on the local dimension of these elections but in doing so it risked being overtaken by Muscat’s national approach to them.

Since Busuttil has not set any targets, probably to insulate himself against defeat, it will be left to others to set his benchmarks.

One can identify two scenarios of defeat for Busuttil. One scenario would be losing more localities to Labour than the party did in 2012 (when elections were held in most of the localities being contested now). Another scenario would be that of the party getting less than the 40%-42% gained in the previous round of elections. 

One has to make allowance for the fact that in 2012 elections were also held in PN stronghold Sliema that does not form part of this round.  

Equally one can identify two scenarios of victory; namely winning more localities than in 2012 and getting a better overall percentage.

Probably the elections will be harder to interpret than this as the PN may recover ground in some areas while losing ground in others. Therefore ultimately what most people will be looking for when local election votes are counted is the overall percentage.

If Busuttil manages to narrow the gap, he will consolidate his leadership and embark on the long way to recovery, which may take him to victory around 2023.  

But if Busuttil fails to make any inroads, his leadership will once again be questioned and the party will be thrown again into disarray. In this sense Busuttil has more to lose than Muscat in these elections. For while Muscat can blame any setback on mid-term blues, the only way for Busuttil should be up and not further down the abyss.  

Busuttil’s referendum calculus

Busuttil failed to break with the past by supporting the abolition of  spring hunting derogation, a cause supported by a majority of PN voters. This may well have been Busuttil’s opportunity to gain sympathy among liberal and young voters alienated by Muscat’s pro hunting stance. But he was prevented from doing so by his own past declarations in favour of retaining the spring hunting derogation. 

But Busuttil must be credited for not torpedoing the ‘no campaign’ by turning the campaign, as he could have done, into a partisan battle between the two leaders.  

Ironically by taking a stance in favour of spring hunting, Busuttil neutralised the impact of Muscat’s pro spring hunting declaration. For Labour voters do not feel any obligation to vote yes, which could have been the case had Busuttil taken a different stance.

Moreover Busuttil has behaved ethically, keeping his word not to make any further declaration about the referendum.

Strategically the referendum may also increase turnout in PN strongholds like St Julians and Attard, where voters who normally shun local elections may turn up to vote against spring hunting. If these voters also decide to vote for PN candidates contesting local elections, they may well help their party reduce the gap. But with AD also contesting these localities, this is far from a foregone conclusion. For these voters have another viable option, especially in Attard, where AD is represented by a respected and established candidate.

Ultimately Busuttil will be remembered for not being bold enough to support the no campaign. But by doing so he may well have saved the no campaign from getting bogged down in a political battle where Busuttil could have been a major liability.

Joseph Muscat: Seeking a plebiscite? 

Initially Muscat wanted to avoid this mid-term test by postponing this round of  local elections to 2019. But after changing his mind and bowing down to criticism on the proposed postponement (thus appearing humble and receptive to criticism), Muscat has campaigned tirelessly to win these local elections, turning them into a referendum on his performance in government rather than an election where citizens simply elect their local representatives.

This indicates that Muscat is seeking a strong mandate which would enable him to push through his agenda in the next months with the least opposition possible.

Unlike Eddie Fenech Adami, who at the peak of his popularity always refused to give a national dimension to local elections, Muscat is doing the exact opposite.

It was Gonzi who first departed from Fenech Adami’s sober approach to local elections by trying to manipulate the results when he withdrew candidates from Marsa and Zejtun in 2006, thus implicitly recognising the national importance of these elections. 

The reason why Muscat is hyping local elections into a national contest could be his assessment that Labour voters may be keener on voting to show support for him, than to elect the party’s local representatives.  

Moreover Muscat has banked on his higher trust rating over the opposition leader and on the feel good factor generated by his successful performance in managing the country’s economy. He may also still be benefiting from the dividends of substantial social reforms like the introduction of civil unions and universal and free child care services while still appealing to the centre-right by posturing to business interests, thus managing to occupy the spectrum traditionally occupied by the PN.

But Muscat does face increasing discontent over his government’s lack of transparency and his policy of rewarding stalwarts like Cyrus Engerer by giving them lucrative posts.  

The latest MaltaToday survey shows Muscat’s approval rating as PM slipping to 42%, in a clear sign that the electorate is showing the first signs of restlessness.

Muscat’s greatest fear is that if this discontent is reflected in the polls it could well have a snowballing effect, fatally wounding his reputation for invincibility three years before general elections.  

In fact for some voters the local elections may well provide a chance to cut Muscat down to size, either for voting for a PN candidate they like, voting for the Greens or by staying at home.  

One advantage for the PN is that disgruntled voters who have yet not warmed up to Simon Busuttil may find it easier to vote for the friendly boy or girl next door who is standing as a PN candidate. This is exactly what Labour wants to avoid by turning these elections into a clear choice between Simon Busuttil and Joseph Muscat.

Labour’s negative campaign

In fact the overdose of negative campaigning targeting Simon Busuttil  (#simoneggativ) suggests a degree of unease within Labour’s ranks and a tacit recognition that the opposition leader is a force to be reckoned with.  

For despite the government’s nine-seat majority, Busuttil’s hard-line opposition pushed the government’s hand on a number of occasions, such as when Muscat was left with no option but to sack his home affairs minister, Manuel Mallia. Moreover while Busuttil disappoints in TV debates, he has given his best in parliament, where he is a constant thorn in the government’s side.

Labour’s spots sneering at Busuttil suggest that the party in government still has an advantage over the PN when it comes to wit and intelligent campaigning. But hitting out at Busuttil’s negativity with negative campaigning may backfire. This is because Labour’s attitude towards Busuttil is reminiscent of the PN’s media shenanigans’ dismissive attitude towards Alfred Sant before 1996, immortalised in the “ma tistax tafdah” billboards.

By belittling the leader of the opposition Labour is showing signs of a superiority complex just two years after being elected to power. A landslide in local elections would well strengthen this tendency.

But so far the electorate’s misgivings on Muscat have not resulted in any gains for the opposition or its leader. This is because Labour retains one major advantage: 

Muscat still outperforms Busuttil in televised confrontation. 

Milking Giovanna 

Moreover by harping on cases involving former PN ministers like Giovanna Debono, Muscat has succeeded in deflecting criticism on the Café Premier bailout, the SOCAR hedging deal and Engerer’s appointment to an €85,000 ambassadorial post. 

MOR voters may increasingly notice the contrast between Muscat’s outrage at the actions of past PN ministers and growing signs of cronyism on his watch.

But other voters, especially switchers, still feel vindicated by cases like that involving Giovanna Debono.  

Muscat may still be benefiting from the natural tendency of switchers to defend the choice they made in the last general elections. In its bid to recover their vote, the PN seems to forget that converts tend to be more fanatical in defending their choices than true believers. 

The Giovanna Debono case also vindicates one of Muscat’s landmark reforms: the introduction of whistle blower legislation.  

But the real test for this important piece of legislation will be when it is used to expose abuse done on Muscat’s watch. For this would show whether whistle blowers denouncing cases involving the government currently in office feel safe enough to come forward.  

Chronicles of a victory foretold

Like Busuttil, Muscat has avoided setting any tangible benchmarks except for saying that he wants to go in the history books as the first PM to win local elections. But this comes across as an easily predictable feat.

After winning two consecutive elections by a 35,000 vote margin, Muscat is the sure winner of next week’s local elections.  

But any gains by the PN, even if modest, over their performance in the previous round of local elections may be interpreted as a setback for Muscat. On the other hand if Muscat wins by a similar margin he would once again have dealt a blow to the opposition. 

This would enable Muscat to ride roughshod over the opposition in the next months. 

For if Muscat manages to strengthen his majority at this stage, this may well be seen as a sign that he is immune from any criticism on lack of transparency.  

Muscat’s greatest difficulty in these elections may well be disgruntlement among Labour voters. Rather than defections to the PN, the greatest problem for Muscat may well be abstentions on his own side that could result in a lower turnout in PL-dominated localities. Yet the past suggests that it is PN voters, especially those in affluent areas, who are less likely to vote in local elections. 

Probably Muscat is banking on a high turnout of PL voters and a low turnout for the PN to retain the party’s 55% majority. But the dynamics of the parallel Spring hunting referendum may thwart this design, raising the turnout in both pro and anti hunting localities.

Muscat’s referendum dilemma

Muscat has refrained from actively campaigning for the hunting lobby but has twice broken his word to stay out of the fray by reiterating that he will be voting yes. Interestingly, Muscat has always spoken on this issue while speaking in Gozo.  

This may suggest that Muscat has made a strategic calculation: that speaking on this issue in Gozo may help him in his bid to retain Qala and perhaps make inroads in other PN dominated localities.  

The dilemma for Muscat is whether his pro hunting declarations will alienate a category of liberal, animal loving and bourgeois voters, whom the party targeted before the 2013 election.  

Moreover Muscat’s unsubstantiated accusation that Busuttil was privately supporting the no camp after having said that he had supported the yes camp, may well have been one of his lowest moments of the campaign.  

Surely Muscat is never keen on losing and will only speak up on an issue if he can milk some political capital out of it.

But it remains unclear whether Muscat’s readiness to stick his neck out for the hunters is his way of honouring his obligations to the hunting lobby in the face of an inevitable defeat, or a sign that Muscat considers the referendum winnable for the yes camp.

For Muscat may well be shielding himself from accusations that he let hunters down by not actively campaigning for them in the referendum even through a few token gestures. For if the no camp wins, it would mean that spring hunting will be abolished on Muscat’s watch. Hunters may never forgive him for not doing enough for their cause.

But if the referendum is winnable by the yes Muscat may well consider it as a golden opportunity to give a knockout blow to the green lobby, before the government embarks on a number of controversial projects like land reclamation, the proposed planning amnesty, the extension of ODZs and the Gozo airstrip.